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Abstract 
The way in which different regions are receiving the international norm of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) has been attracting increasing attention within academia in recent years, most notably 
after the NATO led intervention in Libya in 2011. Academics have attempted to analyse the extent to 
which R2P has been diffused in various states and have argued that states within developing regions 
have begun to localise R2P to make it more congruent with their pre-existing norms and practices in 
order to increase its acceptance. These studies have utilised traditional theories of norm diffusion 
which conceive of norms as static entities with fixed content and as such they have not attempted to 
analyse how the norm has been changing as a result of this process. Furthermore these studies have 
tended to analyse the diffusion of R2P in isolation from other states and other regions and as such, 
no comparative analysis of how regions have received R2P exists. This thesis employs a discursive 
approach, seeking to look at how R2P has been received within three developing regions (Africa, 
Southeast Asia, and Latin America) and in doing so aims to find how regions receptions of R2P differ 
and whether the content of R2P has changed between them. It finds that since the 2005 World 
Summit, receptions to R2P have not significantly altered and that where R2P is being gradually 
diffused it is increasingly becoming a norm for prevention rather than response. 
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Introduction 
Of all the efforts to prevent mass atrocities and killings from occurring around the world since the 
end of the Second World War and the signing of the Genocide Convention, few have attracted as 
much attention as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, a norm which traces its origins from a report 
published in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 
This report was commissioned by then United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan and 
written in response to what many saw as the international community’s failure to prevent, respond 
to, and halt the genocides and mass atrocities that took place around the world in the 1990s. The 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (commonly referred to as R2P) was formally endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005 and sought to redress past errors by endowing states with a responsibility to 
protect civilians from crimes of mass atrocities and was laid out in three tenets: the ‘Responsibility 
to Prevent’ through addressing the root causes of conflict; the ‘Responsibility to React’ to crimes 
when they occur; and the ‘Responsibility to Rebuild’ after the atrocities had been stopped.  
Advocates pointed enthusiastically at the speed with which R2P was adopted around the world and 
many saw a bright and positive future for the norm. This outlook was thought to be justified by the 
myriad of institutions and think tanks such as the ‘International Coalition for the Responsibility to 
Protect’ which were established to garner greater support for the norm and advocates began efforts 
to diffuse and institutionalise the norm within those developing regions which remained or had 
reverted to being ‘R2P resistant’. This picture would seem to portray a relatively rosy forecast for the 
future of R2P and one might believe that despite the heated debates around the norm that arose 
during the 2011 armed intervention in Libya, the increasing acceptance by once resistant regions 
points towards a positive future.  
This is, however, only one part of the story and on 5 September 2012 the United Nations Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon announced that the international community was failing to prevent atrocities 
and that it was failing at its vow of “never again.”1 Over ten years have passed since R2P’s inception 
and the norm has been invoked in nine resolutions to date despite a lack of precise and clear 
framework for how it should be implemented.2 Indeed there is so much disagreement over what 
R2P is and allows for that even its status as a norm is contested.3 Most scholars however conceive of 
R2P as a norm,4 a shared expectation of what constitutes appropriate behaviour5 and it is in this 
                                                          
1 UN Document: GA/11270 
2 See for instance (Bellamy, 2008) on initial criticisms raised against R2P’s wording, and (Reinold, 
2011) for more recent criticisms. 
3 Bellamy, 2009b 
4 Capie, 2012 
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form that much debate within International Relations addresses the subject. Though R2P is clearly 
intended to be universally held, applicable equally to all parts of the globe,6 recent studies such as 
those undertaken by Alex Bellamy, Noha Shawki, and Paul Williams suggest that this is not the case. 
These scholars have attempted to chart how R2P has been thought about and why it has been 
diffused unevenly between developing states. This thesis contributes to this emerging literature by 
undertaking a comparative analysis of Africa’s, Southeast Asia’s, and Latin America’s receptions of 
R2P. It seeks to analyse not just how these developing region’s receptions of R2P have changed 
throughout the norm’s existence, but also how R2P has changed in itself. To do this, the thesis asks 
the question  
 How have developing regions received the norm of R2P since 2005 and why? 
The sub-questions that are addressed in order to answer this question are:  
 How was R2P initially received within Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America? 
 How have these regions responded to specific instances of R2P’s implementation in 
Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and Libya during the 2011 NATO led intervention? 
 How have these regions contributed towards discussion on R2P and what aspects of the 
norm have been emphasised or marginalised? 
This thesis builds on existing literature which looks at the way in which R2P has spread. However, I 
argue that current studies tend to treat the R2P norm as a static concept with fixed content. In 
contrast, I draw on the work of scholars who have embraced a more discursive approach to norm 
diffusion who conceive of norms as processes, and look at how their content is constantly 
reconfigured by actors. These scholars argue that “not all norms have their intended effects, retain 
similar content across countries and time, or share the same basic characteristics.”7 If a norm’s 
content is continually changing, the question of whether or not R2P has been accepted by states 
becomes less important than analysing what it is that states are accepting, and whether or not 
states are accepting the same thing.  
This thesis conceives of R2P as a process that is constantly changing and thus seeks to contribute to 
existing studies of R2P’s diffusion in two ways. First, this thesis focuses on what is being diffused by 
states rather than the extent to which R2P is being diffused. This distinguishes it from other studies 
which have mostly looked at the extent of diffusion within states. Second, by analysing the reception 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 Finnemore, 1996, p. 22 
6 Williams, 2009, p. 394 
7 Krook & True, 2010, p. 104 
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of R2P in three regions (Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America) I am able to contrast the 
experiences of its reception to see in what ways these differ or are similar from one another and 
offer suggestions as to why. To date, studies of R2P’s diffusion have focused specifically on single 
states or regions and have treated them in isolation and thus no comparative analysis of R2P’s 
reception between different regions exists. The combination of these two factors is important, 
because if one conceives of norms as processes which change between actors and over time it is 
likely that actors have different conceptions of what R2P is. This thesis finds that despite over 7 
years having passed since R2P was first endorsed at the World Summit, many developing states have 
not changed significantly in their reception to the norm. There is still an overwhelming tendency for 
these states to refer to R2P only rhetorically, and where progress towards the norm’s diffusion has 
been made it is generally at the expense of R2P’s more controversial reactive capacity. As such, in 
regions such as Africa, where R2P has been more positively received by states, due to advocates’ 
emphasis on the preventative aspects of the norm and its poor implementation during instances 
such as the Libyan intervention, R2P is increasingly being diffused as a preventative norm with little 
or no reactive capacity.  
Methodology and Case Selection 
To address these questions a constructivist approach is used to analyse material collected from a 
thematic data analysis.i Loosely combining methods of process-tracing and discursive theories’ 
‘critical frame analysis’,8 the thesis charts the responses, rhetoric, policy statements, positions, and 
practice of prominent states within the three developing regions.9 The themes which make up the 
analysis are (1) the initial responses to the Responsibility to Protect (2005-2009), (2) responses to 
implementation of the Responsibility to protect (2008 and 2011), and (3) how receptions have 
evolved since Ban Ki-Moon’s report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in 2009.  
Process-tracing is a methodology used to test theories “in a world marked by multiple interaction 
effects, where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables.”10 
This method is well suited to analysing the reception of R2P by states as it allows for identifying 
different causal paths (independent factors) that lead to similar outcomes in different cases 
                                                          
8 This particular discursive methodology is used due to its recognition that “not all actors… have a 
similar ‘voice’ in defining problems and solutions due to structures of social, economic and political 
inequality” (Krook & True, 2010, p. 105). 
9 While regions are difficult to define (some believing they are imagined communities), each region 
has some hegemonic influences that direct the flow of conversation and policy stances within 
regional institutions, and it is these ‘regional powers’ that this thesis focuses primarily upon 
(outlined under case selection in the next chapter). 
10 George & Bennett, 2004, p. 205 
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(dependent factor). For this thesis, the dependent variable is the degree of acceptance of R2P within 
each region while the independent variables are how individual tenets of the norm have been 
treated and discussed by actors within each region. This method has only been ‘loosely’ applied due 
to the realisation that process-tracing is normally a methodology invoked to test multiple theories’ 
ability to explain a particular outcome11 and that while insights from two of norm diffusion’s most 
prominent theories (the ‘norm lifecycle model’ and ‘constitutive localisation’) will be drawn on and 
used to help explain phenomena within the empirical study, this thesis does not seek to use process-
tracing to ‘test’ which theory is more correct.  
The thesis takes a discursive approach for three reasons. First, as an attempt to acknowledge that 
the degree of acceptance of R2P within each developing region is only tentatively known, and as will 
be shown, has fluctuated significantly between actors throughout time. Second, the discursive 
approach taken is due to the belief that norms should be conceived of as processes. Rather than 
treating norms as ‘things’ that are taught12 or advocated,13 this study conceives of them as processes 
which are continually contested, refined, and altered by their interaction with multiple actors. As 
such the thesis “views norms as anchored in language and revealed by repeated speech acts” rather 
than evaluating their worth through commitments written into international treaties or instruments. 
Such an approach is fitting considering the controversy that ensued after the initial ‘unanimous’ 
endorsement in the 2005 UN World Summit.14 Third, it is undertaken due to the resource limitations 
imposed on the thesis. While process tracing is well suited to analysing how the reception of R2P has 
changed, in covering the rhetoric, policy statements, positions, and practice of three developing 
regions in response to R2P, this thesis has been limited by what resources were available online and 
in English and thus sought to analyse material discursively.15 Furthermore, due to the broad scope of 
the research question each region was analysed thematically rather than comprehensively and as 
such the arguments that are made are general indications rather than in depth analyses.  
 
 
                                                          
11 George & Bennett, 2004 
12 Finnemore, 1996 
13 Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 
14 See for example (Traub, 2006) 
15 Because of obvious language barriers which exist when undertaking an analysis of so many 
different regions with such a diverse array of languages, the thesis sought primarily to obtain 
documents from the United Nations Official Document Search which often contained translations of 
government texts. Other records were obtained from the International Coalition on the 
Responsibility to Protect and respective Government websites when possible. 
8 | P a g e  
 
Sources and case studies 
Africa, Southeast Asia,16 and Latin America, are all regions located within the ‘global south’ and 
contain ‘developing states’. The colonial history of each region has significantly impacted on the 
respect given to notions of sovereignty and non-interference. Despite the vastly different locales and 
people that inhabit each region, most are members or observers of the ‘Non Aligned Movement’ 
and share, among other things, a similar strict adherence to the notion of sovereignty. They also 
share, to a certain extent, a similar wariness towards Western states, and a propensity for conflict 
which results from a myriad of factors such as cultural, ethnic, historical and material tensions.  
Despite the similarities between these regions contextually, and the fact that they have all found 
R2P relatively difficult to accept to certain extents, as this thesis argues, their diffusion of R2P has 
only been similar superficially. This thesis attempts to outline how these regions have received R2P 
and why differences have occurred. 
Chapter outline 
The thesis is made up of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a historical overview of the ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ charting its evolution from ‘humanitarian intervention’ to its adoption by the UN General 
Assembly in 2005. It argues that R2P was created first and foremost to respond to mass atrocities 
but is now overwhelmingly focused upon prevention. Chapter 2 discusses two popular theories of 
norm diffusion (the norm lifecycle model and constitutive localisation) and briefly examines existing 
studies of R2P before arguing that norms can be better understood as processes with continually 
changing content. Chapter 3 (Africa), 4 (Southeast Asia), and 5 (Latin America) provide the empirical 
case studies and in the final Chapter (6) I summarise my findings and identify some areas for further 
research.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 The empirical analysis understands Southeast Asia as Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Christmas Island. However, due to the 
rising influence of China within the region, China’s views are also considered in the Southeast Asian 
analysis. 
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Chapter 1: The Responsibility to Protect 
In 2005 191 heads of state and government officials agreed, tacitly or otherwise,17 to the World 
Summit Outcome (WSO) document which laid out the concept of R2P.18  This document is not a 
formal legal instrument or an international treaty,19 rather it is a “set of moral, political and arguably 
legal obligations”20 which outline certain standards of conduct relating to the protection of civilians. 
Since its inception in 2001, R2P has undergone several significant and fundamental changes which 
have altered the content of the norm, changing which aspects are emphasised and refining or 
limiting when it can be used. 
This thesis seeks to analyse how R2P has been received within developing regions21 and as such it is 
concerned with the value and meaning that states have given the norm. Providing a concise 
evaluation of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, its evolution, its meaning, and what it does is made 
difficult by the fact that its ‘widespread consensus’22 does not extend to the variations in its meaning 
and reception between actors. The following chapter seeks to provide a critical overview of the 
emergence and evolution of R2P. Delving briefly into its controversial roots in humanitarian 
intervention, 23  the chapter charts R2P’s emergence from the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty’s report to its rebirth in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document and argues that regardless of advocates’ attempts to frame it as a concept engaged 
primarily with the prevention of atrocities, R2P was envisioned and created for the purposes of 
legitimising humanitarian intervention.  
Humanitarian intervention  
The failure of the international community to prevent, let alone halt, many of the atrocities that took 
place in the 1990s marred a decade which many had thought would be characterised by peace.24 It 
was in response to these conflicts, epitomised by governments fighting their own citizens that the 
                                                          
17 See Bellamy, 2009a; Evans, 2008b  
18 R2P was laid out in paragraphs 138, 139, and 140 (UN Document: A/RES/60/1); and reaffirmed by 
the U.N Security Council in Resolution 1674 (UN Document: S/RES/1674) 
19 See for instance Burke-White, 2011; Welsh & Banda, 2010 
20 Williams, 2009, p. 393 Emphasis added 
21 Some have argued that R2P ‘rejectionism’ can be framed as part of the larger ‘North-South’ 
debate  as most often R2P dissenters come from the ‘Global South’ or ‘developing regions’ such as 
South America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. (Claes, 2012) 
22Despite numerous claims that consensus exists on R2P, some argue that this has been fabricated. 
For more see (Bellamy, 2010; Evans, 2008b)  
23 Bellamy, 2008, p. 617 
24 Evans, 2007a 
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controversial practice of ‘humanitarian intervention’ arose. 25  Humanitarian intervention’s 
fundamental premise is that external actors have a right to intervene militarily in another state to 
protect people against atrocities, without their consent.26 This practice is controversial as it impedes 
a state’s sovereign right of non-interference in their domestic affairs; a right that has existed since 
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and that has been rewritten into the UN Charter.27  
One of the most prominent concerns that arose out of humanitarian intervention was the possibility 
of it being misused by powerful states as a tool for political gain. This concern was driven in part by 
the fact that many developing states had only recently become independent after decades of 
colonial rule and they were fearful that their new found sovereignty would be taken away from 
them forcefully by regime change conducted under the guise of upholding human rights. While HI 
was initially envisioned as being undertaken by the UN, due to several failures28 powerful regional 
organisations and states began to conduct humanitarian interventions unilaterally 29  which 
culminated with the “legitimate, but not legal”30 NATO led intervention in Kosovo in 1999. To many 
sovereignty wary states, the intervention in Kosovo solidified their fears of the possibility of 
humanitarian intervention being misused by larger powers, as the intervention was undertaken 
without UN Security Council authorisation, tarnishing the norm beyond repair.31  
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
Despite the consistent debates about legitimacy, on-going human rights violations saw the issue of 
humanitarian intervention revisited at the end of the 1990s. In 2000 then Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, determined to “reframe the question of intervention, and restore the United Nations to a 
central place in setting the boundaries for what states could do within their own borders”32 famously 
addressed the General Assembly stating that 
                                                          
25 Gierycz, 2010  
26 Evans, 2007a; Gierycz, 2010; Pattison, 2010 
27 While the UN was founded on the principle of protecting human rights and should therefore be 
relatively accommodating of R2P, the Charter limits the use of force to acts of self-defence and acts 
undertaken to maintain international peace and security authorised by the Security Council. 
Furthermore, the Charter denies the UN authorisation to intervene in any states matters which are 
in the domestic jurisdiction of that state. 
28 These failures were perceived to have occurred due to the UN’s lack of political will, authority, and 
military capability(Evans, 2007a; Gierycz, 2010 
29 For instance Australia in East Timor, the British in Sierra Leone, and NATO (primarily the United 
States of America) in Bosnia 
30 Evans, 2007a, p. 707 
31 Evans, 2007a; Alex Bellamy & Paul Williams, 2005 
32 Annan & Mousavizadeh, 2012, p. 114 
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“if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should 
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica- to gross and systematic violations of human 
rights?”33 
In response to this plea, the Canadian government announced its intention to establish and sponsor 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to close the gap between 
the legality and legitimacy of intervention.34 Despite the ICISS’s initial desire to reconceptualise 
humanitarian intervention,35 it was the notion of sovereignty that was left fundamentally altered by 
their efforts which they released in 2001 in a report entitled ‘The responsibility to protect’. This 
report contributed to the field in four main ways. Politically, it changed humanitarian intervention’s 
‘right to intervene’ to a ‘responsibility’ shifting the perspective from those intervening to those that 
needed the intervention in an attempt to delegitimise the self-interested factors for those 
intervening.36 Conceptually, it challenged the idea to think of sovereignty not as control, but as a 
responsibility that was conditional upon the protection of one’s citizens. Third, it emphasised a 
responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild taking the emphasis off military intervention which was 
considered a last and final resort. Finally the report proposed a set of guidelines for when military 
action was to be appropriate and how it should be implemented.  
Using the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’37 ICISS sought to focus “not on what interveners 
are entitled to do (‘a right of intervention’) but on what is necessary to protect people in dire 
need.”38 The ICISS report argued that a sovereign’s primary responsibility was to protect its people 
and endowed states with a ‘responsibility to prevent’ atrocities from happening by addressing the 
causes of conflict.39 While the report established that the primary responsibility for the protection of 
its people lay with the state itself,40 the international community had a parallel responsibility to 
assist states with this task. If a government failed at its responsibility to protect its citizens, “its claim 
to sovereign immunity bec*ame+ void.”41 The report stated that once a state had been deemed 
illegitimate, the international community had a ‘responsibility to react’ through intervention or non-
                                                          
33 UN Document: A/RES/54/20   
34 Axworthy, 2003, p. 191; ICISS, 2001; Thakur & Weiss, 2009, p. 35  
35 Axworthy, 2003; Bellamy, 2008; ICISS, 2001, p. 620  
36 Evans, 2007a 
37 The notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was created by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen 
which claimed a state’s primary responsibility was for the wellbeing of its citizens and any state that 
was unable to fulfill that capacity should welcome international assistance or forfeit is claim to non-
interference. For more see(Bellamy, 2008, p. 619)and (Deng, 2006, p. 218) 
38 Bellamy, 2008, p. 620 
39 Bellamy, 2008; ibid 
40 ICISS, 2001, p. xi; supra note 4 p. xi 
41 Reinold, 2011, p. 60 
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violent tools to halt the conflict42  and finally a ‘responsibility to rebuild’ the polities and societies 
afterwards.43   
Despite stressing that prevention was the critical component of R2P,44 “the commission’s main focus 
was on intervention.”45 Subsequently, out of the 85 pages in the ICISS report 9 pages were devoted 
to prevention, 16 to the responsibilities to prevent and rebuild, and 32 pages to intervention.46 Like 
humanitarian intervention before it, ICISS envisioned R2P being authorised by the Security Council 
first and foremost.47 However, to avoid the stalemates within the council which had caused the 
necessary but illegal Kosovo intervention,48 the ICISS report proposed that permanent members 
refrained from using their power of veto on matters that are not vital to their national interests.49 If 
a member did veto intervention, recourse was to be made within the General Assembly, then within 
regional arrangements then by coalitions of the willing, and finally by individual states themselves.50  
The origins of R2P are firmly rooted in the practice of humanitarian intervention from which it 
evolved. The meaning and content of R2P however is not static but continually changing due to 
varying interpretations by actors attempting to implement or constrain it. Since the ICISS document, 
R2P has undergone several changes in how it is conceptualised in an attempt to increase its support 
and make it operational. These changes have primarily sought to deemphasise its interventionist 
aspects and increase its preventative ones. One of the earliest and most critical changes occurred as 
advocates attempted to gain support for it within the UN, and the general understanding that 
emerged from the World Summit in 2005 (dubbed ‘R2P lite’)51 differs significantly from the ICISS 
version. 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was raised in the 2005 World Summit after receiving support from 
both Kofi Annan (in the form of a report In Larger Freedom) and the UN ‘High level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change’. 52 After much deliberation and difficulty, the wording of R2P was included 
                                                          
42 ICISS, 2001, p. xi 
43 Bellamy, 2008, p. 621 
44 ICISS, 2001, p. xi 
45 Bellamy, 2008, p. 621 
46 Bellamy, 2008, p. 621 
47 Bellamy, 2008; Pattison, 2010 
48 G. Evans, 2012 
49 Reinold, 2011 
50 Bellamy, 2008, p. 621 
51 See (Weiss, 2007, p. 117) who argues that conditions added by the WSO document requiring 
interventions to be authorized by the UN Security Council dilutes the concept making it  ‘R2P lite’. 
52 Reinold, 2011, p. 61 
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in three paragraphs of the WSO document53 despite having only been “negotiated by a relatively 
small number of states.”54 While this “unanimous” endorsement55 was later contested by many, 
especially developing, states56 its adoption by the General Assembly (in April 2006)57 and subsequent 
reaffirmations by the Security Council in resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) have strengthened 
its position on the world stage.58  
The R2P that was articulated in the WSO document is considerably different from the R2P that was 
proposed by the ICISS in 2001. Although some of the changes that were made simply clarified 
components of the concept, other changes were made for the benefit of those fearful that R2P 
would be used to legitimise “hegemonic intervention in their internal affairs”59 and regime change.60 
The most significant alterations are as follows. Where the ICISS report held R2P to apply to states 
which were “unwilling or unable” to protect their populations, the WSO document restricted this to 
only apply to states which were “manifestly failing to protect their populations.”61 Furthermore the 
WSO document narrowed R2P to only apply to “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity”62 rather than using the ‘just war’ doctrine as ICISS had proposed. Any action 
undertaken was to be collective and required Security Council authorisation. 63 Perhaps most 
importantly “*t+he tacit association with humanitarian intervention” was dropped and its 
preventative aspects were emphasised.64   
The WSO document left a considerably vaguer R2P and those actors that embraced it did so with 
large variations in language as they sought to either broaden or narrow its utility.65 After its 
endorsement by the international community it was widely agreed that for R2P to progress from 
                                                          
53 See Evans, 2007b 
54 (Williams, 2009, p. 402). Many within the developing world (and even larger countries such as 
Russia and China) felt the World Summit had been high jacked by the West which, given time 
constraints, resulted in a rushed and controversial agreement to the Outcome Document. For more 
see Traub, 2006 
55 Bellamy, 2010, p. 143 
56 See Evans, 2007b 
57 UN Document: A/RES/60/1 
58 Capie, 2012, p. 78 
59 Capie, 2012 
60 While intervention does not necessarily lead to ‘regime change’, governments that ‘manifestly fail’ 
to protect their citizens from mass atrocities are, unfortunately, often the ones carrying out these 
acts and the only way to protect citizens from the regime, is to overthrow them (Evans, 2008b; Luck, 
2011) 
61 UN Document: A/RES/60/1, Article 139, 
62 Ibid  
63 Reinold, 2011, p. 62 
64 Capie, 2012 
65 G. Evans, 2012, 11 minutes 
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word to deed, three challenges needed to be overcome.66 R2P had to be refined conceptually, 
politically, and institutionally in order for consensus regarding “what *it+ actually meant in particular 
real world situations” to emerge.67 One of the most prominent attempts to do this was outlined in 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2009) which 
suggested that the paragraphs 138 and 139 of the WSO document rest on “three pillars” 
summarised as follows:  
“*1+ the primary responsibility of states *is+ to protect their own populations from the four crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as from their 
incitement;
68
 *2+ the international community’s responsibility to assist a state to fulfil its RtoP; and *3+ 
the international community’s responsibility to take timely and decisive action, in accordance with 
the UN Charter, in cases where the state has manifestly failed to protect its population from one or 
more of the four crimes.”69  
The World Summit Outcome document and subsequent reiterations by R2P’s advocates have 
significantly altered the content of the norm in order to increase the international community’s 
support for it and improve its implementation. Advocates have claimed that the most recent 
conceptualization of Ban Ki-moon's ‘three pillar’ approach has been unanimously accepted, with 
even developing states or those that have thus far been cautious towards R2P slowly accepting and 
implementing it.70 This reaffirmation by Ban Ki-moon also saw a tactical change in how R2P was 
marketed as “advocates … put almost all of their emphasis on pillar one and two activities, stressing 
their preventive and consensual nature.”71 
While these attempts to refine R2P have generally sought to narrow its scope or strengthen its 
foundations72 and make it more palatable for the international community to agree upon and 
endorse, there are some who would argue that these efforts have ‘watered *R2P+ down.’73 Theresa 
Reinold, a scholar who has approached the subject of R2P with perhaps more caution than most, 
                                                          
66 G. Evans, 2012, 12 minutes 
67 G. Evans, 2012, 12.10 minutes 
68 These crimes were proposed during the 2005 debates and were since reaffirmed in Resolution 
1674 (UN Document: S/RES/1674) 
69 Taken from  (Bellamy, 2010, p. 143)  
70 See for instance (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011) who argue that countries within Asia are slowly 
accepting and implementing R2P type behaviour, despite traditionally contesting norms which 
override sovereignty (including R2P). 
71 Capie, 2012 
72 Luck, 2011 
73 Bellamy, 2009b 
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wrote in 2010 that “*t+he Outcome Document obviously left critical elements of R2P unaddressed.”74 
She is not alone in her sentiment, and many others are sceptical of R2Ps seemingly diminished 
power and scope. These differences in opinion can be put into two categories: those who conceive 
of R2P as a “rallying cry”75 to operationalise the international community into responding to mass 
atrocity crimes; and those who interpret it as a framework for the prevention of conflict.76  
Rethinking R2P 
While advocates such as Bellamy and Luck argue that it is important “not to confuse what we would 
like the R2P principle to be with what it actually is”77 it is equally important not to forget why R2P 
was created in the first place. In 2008 Bellamy argued that 
“R2P sets out responsibilities that states have to their own citizens… that all states have as 
members of the international community…. *as well as the+ responsibilities that certain 
institutions have. Contrary to much contemporary writing on the subject, R2P does not set 
out criteria for the use of force… *or+ offer pathways for intervention not authorized by the 
Security Council.”78  
Such a realisation of R2P starkly contrasts with the original ICISS conception. In 2009 Thakur and 
Weiss stated that the ICISS was mandated “to build a broader understanding of the tension between 
intervention and state sovereignty and to find common ground for military intervention to support 
humanitarian objectives.”79 Even Bellamy has noted that R2P “was primarily concerned with 
reconceptualising humanitarian intervention” and that the ICISS’s main aim was to “reconcile the 
occasional need for armed intervention… with the principles of state sovereignty.”80  
The impetus for R2P’s creation is clear, written within the very report that gave it birth and by those 
who commissioned and created it.  It was a solution brought about to “respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica- to gross and systematic violations of human rights”81 and in an attempt to garner greater 
support from sovereignty wary states, advocates have emphasised its preventative rather than its 
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interventionist aspects.82 But what effect has this emphasis had? While few would argue against the 
notion that R2P was initially created to reconcile the competing notions of humanitarian 
intervention, sovereignty, and ‘non-interference’ with which it contrasted,83 many scholars today 
seem to feel that what R2P was and what R2P is are no longer the same things.  
Following the General Assembly debates from 2009 to 2012 it is clear that R2P has become more 
widely accepted by the international community.84 But just which aspects of R2P are “widely 
accepted”? To many, the wording of R2P in the WSO document was inadequate and failed to 
“provide clear guidance about the circumstances in which coercive military intervention might be 
justified or about the appropriate decision-making in times of major humanitarian emergencies.”85 
Indeed immediately after its acceptance in 2005 by the UN General Assembly, some states back 
peddled in their commitment causing a ‘post 2005 revolt’86 or “blow back.”87 These sceptics claimed 
that “the World Summit rejected R2P in 2005” and that “the concept of the responsibility to protect 
itself … was not accepted or approved as a principle by the General Assembly”.88 These countries 
which suffer from “buyer’s remorse”, as Evans put it,  have consistently sought to undermine or 
deflate R2P as they fear it could be used to justify powerful states intervening in weak ones in the 
same manner that ‘humanitarian Intervention’ could have allowed before it.89  
Conclusion 
In the first five years of its existence R2P changed from a concept designed to ‘close the gap 
between the legitimacy and legality of humanitarian intervention’ to a ‘principle’ that sets out 
responsibilities which states have. Even after this significant shedding of normative weight, 
numerous states claim to have rejected R2P and the resulting “blow back” has made statements of 
its ‘unanimous endorsement’ seem somewhat hollow. Over ten years have passed since R2P’s initial 
inception and efforts to diffuse and operationalize R2P continue with advocates evolving and 
adapting the strategies they employ to garner support. To this end, numerous studies have been 
conducted in an attempt to analyse whether R2P is being accepted by sceptical states. These efforts 
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have utilised theories of norm diffusion to analyse either external or internal efforts by actors to 
localise or adopt the norm. Many of these studies are optimistic about R2P’s future and have argued 
that even where individual states may be reluctant to accept R2P, their regional organisations and 
neighbours have started to engage in “R2P-related policy priorities.”90  The next chapter provides an 
overview of this literature against the backdrop of the scholarship on norm diffusion in international 
relations. 
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Chapter 2: Norms and norm diffusion 
The status of R2P is contested. It has been referred to as a “facilitating norm”,91  an “evolving norm,” 
a “principle,”92 and a “concept” each term endowing it with a different status which ultimately 
changes its functionality.93 While the UN General Assembly and the ICISS commission have both 
referred to R2P as an “emerging principle”94  there appears to be a widespread consensus amongst 
academics to refer to it as a norm (whether emerging, facilitating, nascent, or global).95  
Norms are “shared expectations about appropriate behaviours held by a community of actors”.96 
Constructivists hold that an actors’ behaviour is shaped by non-material factors and that they seek 
to look at the way in which identity and interests are altered by ideas, beliefs, and knowledge.97 To 
constructivists, norms are important as they represent one “explanatory variable” which form an 
actor’s identity and impact on their behaviour.98 Constructivist scholarship on norms attempts to 
discern how they are spread and accepted by actors and has undergone several significant changes 
or ‘waves’ becoming a central point of focus for those seeking to explain the role of non-material 
factors in world politics.99  
The first wave of this scholarship developed out of moral cosmopolitanism and saw norms as 
universal or static ‘things’100 that were taught by transnational moral entrepreneurs (or non-local 
advocates) who had strong beliefs about what constituted good behaviour and attempted to 
persuade others to accept their ideas.101 Literature in this initial discourse focused primarily on the 
way in which norm-makers apply pressure on norm-takers.102  
‘Second-wave’ scholarship arose out of attempts to discover “the causal mechanisms and processes 
by which… ideas spread”103 by analysing “how domestic political structures and agents condition 
normative change.”104 This wave of scholarship attempted to reduce the focus on the non-local 
influences that first wave scholarship had had and argued that domestic actors could frame or graft 
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norms to make them more congruent with existing norms which would increase their chances of 
being adopted.105  
From the vast array of scholarship produced on norm diffusion, two theories, the ‘norm lifecycle 
model’ and ‘constitutive localisation’, have become increasingly prominent amongst scholars seeking 
to chart the evolution R2P and give weight to its explanatory capability in International Relations. 
The rest of this chapter outlines these theories and argues that they both treat norms as static 
objects with fixed content that can be advocated by non-local actors and diffused by local ones. 
While such a conceptualisation of norms makes analysing them easier, this thesis holds that norms 
should be conceived of as processes in which both ‘outsiders’ as well as ‘locals’ engage in efforts to 
change their content as they are diffused.106 Such a conceptualisation of the norm diffusion process 
allows for valuable insights to be drawn out of a comparative study of R2P’s reception in developing 
regions due to its ability to better account for variations in reception between actors.  
Norm life cycle model 
To constructivists, norms are causally linked to “change and transformation in the international 
system as change is the result of shifts in the ideas and norms that underlie the system and shape 
actors’ identities and behaviours”.107 According to Finnemore and Sikkink, before norms can 
influence behaviour and political change they need to evolve through a patterned “lifecycle”.108 This 
lifecycle model separates norm evolution into three stages: norm emergence, norm cascades, and 
norm internalisation.109  
The first stage in the model is that of norm emergence where agents call attention to, or create 
issues by naming and dramatising them in a process referred to as framing. During this stage norms 
are “actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their 
community”.110 Agents promote their norm through “organisational platforms”111 using a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’112 as they  attempt to garner more support and persuade other actors and states to 
endorse them.  
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If promotion is successful and a “critical mass” of states endorses a norm it reaches a “tipping point” 
where the new norm redefines what constitutes appropriate behaviour for a group of actors.113 
During this phase of the lifecycle model the norm “spreads or cascades relatively rapidly among the 
remaining countries” regardless of any domestic pressure to change. 114  Socialisation is the 
“dominant mechanism of a norm cascade”115 and states adopt the norm in a relatively swift 
succession for a variety of reasons such as a desire to enhance their “self-esteem”116 or from fear of 
being ridiculed for deviation.117  
As norms evolve through the lifecycle model they become more and more institutionalised in the 
procedures and processes of those that are adopting them.118 The more frequently they are used in 
bilateral agreements, international law, and international organisations the more they acquire a 
“taken-for-granted quality”119 and become internalised. Norm internalisation is the final stage in the 
lifecycle model and is said to occur when a norms’ compliance by states becomes automatic and 
they are no longer challenged or contested.120  
The lifecycle model details a course in which norms are created through a competitive process of 
promotion by international actors who have strong beliefs about what constitutes desirable and 
good behaviour. The ability for a norm to complete this model and become “taken-for-granted” 
however is far from assured and many norms fail to garner sufficient support to ‘tip’ and cause a 
cascade. According to Finnemore and Sikkink norms fail to become internalised for a variety of 
reasons, such as the quality of the norm121 or the quality of those actors promoting the norm. Such 
explanations, while important, place too much emphasis on ‘international’ efforts to diffuse norms, 
treating norm-takers as static receivers and failing to take into account the range of domestic factors 
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that can not only alter a norms possibility of diffusion, but alter the norm itself. The next section will 
outline one of the most prominent alternative models to the lifecycle model.  
Constitutive Localisation 
The lifecycle model is a “top down” model primarily concerned with how international or universal 
norms that set standards of appropriate behaviour for states are diffused122 and as such the role of 
local actors are confined to being static recipients of norms in all but the very early phases of the 
process. Constitutive localisation was derived as a response to this failure of first and second wave 
theories of norm diffusion to account for the agency of norm-takers as well as norm-makers.  
A theory devised by Amitav Acharya, constitutive localisation can be defined as “the active 
construction (through discourse, framing, grafting and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local 
actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and 
practices.”123 It is a “framework for investigating norm diffusion that stresses the agency role of 
norm-takers.”124 While second wave theories had already attempted to assess “the existential fit 
between domestic and outside identity norms”125 and their likelihood of being diffused by measuring 
their “cultural-match” or “cognitive priors”,126 this process was relatively static with norm-takers still 
seen as recipients.127 Constitutive localisation sought to show how local actors or norm-takers “build 
congruence between the local… and external norms.”128 While norm diffusion may begin with 
reinterpretation and representation (via acts of framing and grafting), localisation holds that 
occasionally it will extend beyond this to ‘reconstitution’ where norm-takers undertake acts of 
pruning, rejecting those aspects of the norm in order to increase its “congruence” or “cultural 
match.”129  
Localisation occurs because new international norms are not created in an international vacuum. As 
Finnemore and Sikkink establish during the initial phase of the lifecycle model, norms enter a 
contested space and norm-makers must compete with one another to gain support for their 
norm.130 This contested space is not isolated to the international level however, and norms being 
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diffused in new countries must compete with relevant pre-existing beliefs and values just as norms 
compete on the international stage and during their emergence. While the quality of a norm and its 
entrepreneurs certainly alters the likelihood of acceptance, constitutive localisation holds that these 
conditions are not the only factors at stake.131 Like other second-wave theories, localisation holds a 
norm’s congruence with existing ideas and beliefs alters the prospects of it being diffused. Unlike 
second-wave theories however, congruence is not seen as a “static fit” but rather a dynamic process 
which is altered by the local historical and institutional context of the region.132  
According to Acharya there are three factors which change whether a norm is localised or accepted 
wholesale: first, how does the new foreign norm relate to established or traditional norms within the 
region? The stronger pre-existing norms are, the more likely the new norm will be localised. Second, 
what quality are the advocates or entrepreneurs at the local level? Local actors must have “sufficient 
discursive power to be able to outperform outside norm entrepreneurs” as well as be seen as 
credible upholders of local values and identities within their regions. 133 Third, what are the benefits 
of adopting the norm? Similar to the socialisation process of the lifecycle model, the prestige or 
reputational rewards an actor receives for diffusing a norm alter whether it is localised or accepted 
outright.134  
Localisation was designed to restore agency to local actors during the norm diffusion process, 
something lacking in first wave theories which prescribed a “top-down” method of diffusion. While 
Acharya successfully manages to make up for inadequacies in the lifecycle model and account for 
the way in which local actors play an active role in norm diffusion, the process is largely quiet on 
how local and non-local actors interact.135  According to Capie, while the localisation framework “is 
helpful in shifting our emphasis away from global norm entrepreneurs and towards the agency of 
regional actors”, the focus should not be one sided, as efforts to change a norms content “by 
outsiders as well as locals… are important.”136 Furthermore, Capie argues that localisation conceives 
of norms being “essentially exported with … fixed content” which is clearly conceived of in the minds 
of non-locals and can be pruned by those attempting to diffuse it.137 In this way, he reemphasises 
original criticisms levelled against earlier cosmopolitan theories of norm diffusion and finds that the 
same problems are inherent in localisation. The theory of constitutive localisation like the ‘norm 
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lifecycle model’ becomes problematic for studying norm diffusion because their explanatory 
capacities are largely one sided whereas norm diffusion is a dynamic and competitive process of 
interaction between local and non-local or international actors. The following section provides a 
brief overview of how existing theories of norm diffusion have been used to analyse R2P’s reception 
by states, before arguing why a discursive conceptualisation of norms is useful.  
Existing studies of R2P diffusion 
Existing literature regarding R2P is so extensive that it has led some scholars to claim that if one 
were to measure R2P’s development by the amount of attention and rhetorical support it has 
received they could “be inclined to believe that the responsibility to protect is rapidly evolving into a 
norm of customary international law.”138 The diversity of discussion that has taken place regarding 
R2P is large and involves many academic disciplines. Although critics of R2P still focus on its 
intervention aspects, in recent years discussion has shifted substantially from ‘whether to 
implement’ and now focuses on ‘how to implement’ its preventative aspects.139  This shift in attitude 
has given rise to new questions about the strength and utility of the norm.  
International Relations literature has progressed through debates concerned with the fundamental 
function of R2P (preventative or reactive), how R2P is being accepted and implemented by states, 
and most recently how regional organisations can help the diffusion and implementation processes.  
Early studies which sought to analyse how accepted R2P has become were often optimistic about 
R2P’s status and its future trajectory.140 According to Jennifer Welsh, R2P’s initial “overplay*ed+” 
success story was a result of “the tendency to view the development of norms as a linear 
process.”141 Here, scholars using the ‘norm lifecycle model’ wrongly believed that its acceptance in 
the WSO document and by the Security Council showed how R2P was nearing a norm cascade and 
was on its way to full acceptance.142 Advocates efforts to increase R2P consensus in critical regions 
however led to backslide in popularity and renewed arguments about the norms provisions; 
subsequently many states claimed that they had “rejected” R2P during the World Summit rather 
than having endorsed it.143  
Perhaps in an attempt to mitigate the failure of Finnemore and Sikkink’s linear model to account for 
negative normative change, Noha Shawki attempted to backtrack on those predictions made by 
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other ‘norm lifecycle model’ theorists in 2011 and claim that R2P was still in the early stages of 
development. Shawki argued that R2P has the “potential to evolve into a viable norm and that some 
of the theoretical lenses developed in the constructivist literature can be very useful in helping us 
think about the evolution and future potential of R2P.”144 Thus, to Shawki, R2P is still an emerging 
norm which with much more development could one day reach the ‘norm cascade’ stage and 
“develop into a legitimate and viable international norm.”145 
To critics however, such a model of norm diffusion was worryingly linear and its fixation on 
international or transnational advocates meant that it could not account for how developing states 
had been receiving the norm. To this end, some began to use Acharya’s theory on ‘constitutive 
localisation’ to analyse the diffusion of R2P by stubborn states. Scholars argued that localisation was 
necessary in regions such as Southeast Asia due to its history of devotion to non-interference and 
often open hostility towards R2P. These studies, like those undertaken using the lifecycle model 
beforehand, are relatively optimistic and some have concluded that the localisation process has 
begun. 146  According to Bellamy and Drummond, localisation efforts have produced an 
accommodation between the principles of non-interference and R2P which have been subtly 
realigned in order to make them compatible with one another. They argue that states within this 
region are creating their own “localised variant of sovereignty as responsibility” which is more 
congruent to the locale.  
Towards a discursive conceptualisation of norms 
While there appears to be a tendency for academics to treat localisation and the norm lifecycle 
model in isolation from one another,147 norms do not diffuse from either top down or bottom up 
efforts. Instead the process of diffusion is one in which local (or bottom) and non-local (top) 
advocates compete against each other and change a norm’s content as they are diffused. As such, 
localisation should not be seen as a radical challenge to the norm ‘lifecycle model’ but an evolution, 
with the ‘lifecycle model’ accounting for the role of “NGOs, transnational advocacy networks and 
liberal states” while localisation accounts for the role of “local and regional actors in receiving 
[norms+ and reconstructing them.”148 Combining both theories of norm diffusion would allow for a 
process which establishes how norms emerge, are promoted and diffused internationally, and are 
then localised in particular areas of the world. These processes do not happen in a step by step 
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fashion, instead they overlap one another as local and non-local actors all compete to diffuse, 
contest, and reject norms. For this reason, the process-tracing methodology utilised to undertake 
the empirical analysis in this thesis is not an attempt to test which theory better accounts for how 
R2P has been diffused, as norms diffuse through the efforts of both local and non-local actors, which 
neither theory can account for alone. Furthermore, because of these deficits in the norm lifecycle 
model and constitutive localisation, this thesis analyses R2P’s reception within a discursive 
framework which enables tenets to be drawn from both theories allowing for a more comprehensive 
evaluation. This approach is presented within the thematic enquiries that each regions empirical 
analysis is undertaken in.  
In addition to this, the discursive approach also allows for the conceptualisation of norms as 
processes. Norms are not universal containers with fixed content known by their advocates:149 
rather, they are often vague “enabling their content to be filled in many ways… to be appropriated 
for a variety of different purposes.”150 Krook and True argue that conceiving of norms as processes 
requires a more discursive approach which “offers greater analytical leverage for explaining why 
norms emerge and appear to diffuse rapidly, at the same time that they rarely achieve their 
intended aims.”151 Such a conceptualization of norms is useful for analysing the diffusion of R2P 
within the developing world as it recognises that not all norms have their intended effects or “retain 
similar content across countries and time.”152 
It is relatively clear that not only conceptions, but the actual content of R2P has changed since it was 
established in 2001. While this change may have initially been relatively cohesive, summarised in the 
WSO document and subsequent statements by the UN, R2P has not yet been accepted or 
operationalized by all resistant states. While Southeast Asia’s current process of diffusion has been 
characterised by its adherence to non-interventionism, it is not the only region of the world that has 
been critical of R2P. Other diffusion efforts in places such as Africa (where some have claimed the 
norm is also being ‘localised’)153 may have been characterised by other features which could allow 
for multiple variations of the norm between states as well as regions. Such a realisation is 
problematic because it makes implementation of R2P by a ‘unified’ international community much 
more difficult to obtain if variants in what precisely R2P means and how it should be invoked differ.  
Regional Organisations and the Responsibility to Protect 
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In part as an answer to these problems, advocates have recently begun to emphasise how regional 
organisations can contribute to R2P’s diffusion and implementation. Following General Assembly 
debates in 2010 and 2011, several claims have been made regarding the need to strengthen and 
further integrate R2P through, and within, regional arrangements.154 Edward Luck, assistant to the 
UN Secretary General, states that “the process of internalization of [R2P] principles within national 
societies, institutions, and governments is not far advanced” and that there is a need to “build 
stronger and wider relationships among global, regional, and sub-regional organisations”.155 This 
desire to increase institutionalization of R2P within regional arrangements could have several 
benefits for its implementation. 
First, regional organisations can act as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who advocate and help diffuse norms 
to other actors (for instance sub-regional and local).156 Furthering regional organisations acceptance 
of the norm would increase pressure on its non-norm supporting members, potentially garnering 
more acceptance for R2P in doing so. Second, a regional organisation advocate could cause more 
wholesale support for R2P as an entirety, meaning that states supporting pillars 1 and 2 would also 
be more inclined to support pillar 3. Third, Chapter VIII of the UN charter foresees the need for 
regional arrangements to partake in peacekeeping (or pillar 3 of R2P); increasing institutionalization 
of R2P within these organisations would make it easier to call upon them when needed.157 Fourth, 
regional organisations increase the ‘preventative’ capacity of R2P by setting up early warning 
detection systems, regional security forums and monitoring groups which contribute greatly to the 
implementation of pillar 1 and 2 of R2P.158 Fifth, regional arrangements have the ability to play a 
crucial ‘gatekeeping’ role within their expanse.  Bellamy and Williams argue that regional 
arrangements define problems, terms of engagement and “establish the conditions under which the 
Security Council could consider adopting enforcement measures”.159 They argue that the reason the 
international community intervened in Libya and not Syria in 2011 was in part due to the 
‘gatekeeping’ role which the League of Arab States played, endorsing action against Libya whilst 
avoiding comment on the situation in Syria.160 The need for regional arrangements to institutionalize 
R2P becomes vital if they are expected to partake in the detection of R2P violations and have the 
ability to influence whether, and how, the international community should respond.  
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The importance of regional arrangements in regards to R2P is clearly evident through the extent of 
literature being published in this field. In line with the idea that regional organisations can 
‘strengthen’ R2P, academics have begun to raise questions such as ‘how might cross-regional 
dialogue be encouraged, and what role should the UN play in this process?’, ‘how have neighbours 
mitigated or exacerbated atrocity risk [and] how do these dynamics impact the functioning and role 
of regional arrangements?’ and ‘how can regional capacity for prevention and response be 
built?’.161These questions are important and will prove vital in furthering the understanding of 
regional arrangements potential in the field of R2P. However, the idea that these organisations can 
help strengthen R2P within their regions and beyond is reliant on the fact that they accept the norm 
in the first place, which is not always the case. An organisation can hardly be expected to advocate 
and strengthen something which it does not accept.  
The different emphasis that states place on the pillars of R2P and the lack of agreement between 
organisations’ member states could seriously hinder the positive impact that regional arrangements 
have. While it is not necessary for every member of a regional organisation to be R2P ‘engaged’162 
(as organisations can act as a norm advocates), a lack of cohesive agreement on conceptualisation of 
R2P could lead to arguments about how to interpret it rather than how to implement it. Thus, in an 
unfortunate roundabout way, efforts to use regional organisations to advocate and diffuse R2P 
amongst critical or sceptical states are hindered by the fact that these states do not accept the norm 
and disagree on its parameters in the first place. 
The desire for regional organisations to act as norm entrepreneurs unfortunately rests on the 
assumption that there is a cohesive understanding of what R2P is and how it should be implemented 
within the regions that form these organisations. Ban Ki-Moon’s ‘three pillar’ approach clearly 
envisioned R2P as being a “universal concept, applicable equally to all parts of the globe.”163 
However these recent attempts by scholars to analyse how R2P has been diffused and localised by 
developing states suggests that R2P is anything but, and the developing regions of Africa, South Asia, 
and Latin America all contain states that have accepted or rejected the norm which has led to 
controversial and problematic implementations.  While this un-cohesive approach to R2P is not 
exclusive to these regions, they are often the ones identified as having populations at risk from mass 
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atrocity crimes.164 Subsequently it is in these regions that external advocates vigorously attempt to 
diffuse R2P.     
In 2009 Thakur and Weiss wrote that “a normative consensus is emerging in international society 
about a state’s responsibilities and accountabilities both to domestic and international 
constituencies.”165 This statement has also been made by numerous other advocates, such as 
Bellamy and Evans, who have also claimed that R2P has become unanimously accepted by states. If 
norms such as R2P are processes rather than entities with fixed content, the question of how R2P 
has been received within regions becomes relevant as its meaning and operationalization may differ 
amongst actors and regions. The following chapters give empirical case studies which seek to look at 
this problem, and analyse how receptions of R2P differ between developing regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Africa, an increasing commitment to prevention? 
In the beginning of this century many looked towards Africa’s changing peace and security 
architecture with relative optimism. A region which had been united under the banner of pan-
Africanism and had strictly adhered to norms of non-interference and sovereignty as it sought to end 
colonial rule emerged touting ‘African solutions for African problems’ attempting to change its 
notion of ‘non-interference’ to ‘non-indifference’. Contained within the very core of its new regional 
architecture, the African Union’s (AU) Constitutive Act, was the claim that the Union had the right to 
intervene in others’ states with or without consent.  
The institutional similarities between R2P and those enshrined within the African Union and its 
surrounding body of organisations has led many commentators to note that ‘R2P emerged from 
Africa’ and that the AU “is founded upon ideas at the heart of the R2P agenda.”166 Indeed there were 
high hopes for the organisation and, acting under these emerging norms, the AU intervened 
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promptly in the crises in Burundi and Darfur in 2003 to halt the atrocities taking place, despite 
unresolved questions as to the requirement for UN Security Authorisation.167  
Unfortunately this honeymoon period was short-lived and commentators pointed towards on-going 
conflicts in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the failure of the AU to halt 
atrocities in Darfur to argue that Africa was failing at its R2P.168 The African Union seems to have 
inherited more from its prior organisation than many had first imagined, including a lack of will to 
respond or react against the many incumbent regimes within the continent.169 More recently, the 
AU and many of its members, despite having expressed their concern against atrocities being 
committed in Libya in 2011, not only failed to react in order to halt them, but explicitly condemned 
the actions taken by those who did. 
Institutional Architecture and cognitive priors 
Atrocities that took place during the 1990s not only provided the impetus for the creation of the 
R2P, but also for the African Union which was established in 2000 to replace the by then obsolete 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU).170 The OAU which was established in 1963 was a reflection of 
African society at the time and enshrined the conservative conceptions of sovereignty held by 
African states which stemmed from their fears of internal subversion and foreign domination.171 
These norms ensured that the OAU was legally and operationally unequipped to intervene in either 
intra or inter-state conflicts, which blocked the organisation from preventing or halting atrocities.172 
After a series of internal debates which reviewed the OAU in regards to its strict adherence to non-
intervention and its ban on peacekeeping, it was agreed “that the OAU had become a defunct and 
anachronistic institution that should be replaced by a new organisation … equipped to deal with 
such challenges.”173 
The African Union was established in May 2001 and has been mandated to promote peace and 
security, anticipate and prevent conflicts, promote and implement peace building and post-conflict 
reconstruction, promote and encourage “democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, 
through the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the sanctity of human life, and 
international humanitarian law.174 Of most relevance for this thesis is the founding document of the 
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Union, the Constitutive Act (2000), which in Article 4(h) establishes “the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” which is comparable to 
R2P’s pillar 3, and Article 4(j) which establishes “the right of Member States to request intervention 
from the Union in order to restore peace and security.”175  
In stark contrast to the OAU, and in accordance with the AU’s wider protection mandate, the 
organisation does not require a state’s consent to intervene in its internal affairs. These two articles 
(4(h) and (j)), and the larger protection and prevention mandate that reaffirm them have caused 
many commentators to note that the “AU’s new peace and security architecture is being built 
around the ideas set out in the R2P”176 or that the “AU’s norms and principles mirror the R2P.”177 In 
fact, at first glance the African Union’s peace and security architecture would seem to go beyond the 
new norm as it is laid out in the WSO Document, giving the Union the right rather than the 
responsibility to intervene and even allowing for states to request intervention in another state if it 
is seen to be abusing its citizens.  
In addition to these principles, African states have set up various structures and mechanisms which 
are relatively geared towards the preventative pillars (1 and 2) of R2P. For instance, there is an 
elaborate continental early warning system, a Panel of the Wise, and a Peace and Security Council - 
all of which have undertaken R2P-like activities in the past.178 This array of institutions is increasingly 
being associated with R2P by African leaders and norm entrepreneurs who signal to them as a sign 
of the continent’s growing acceptance of and steady effort to internalise and operationalize R2P.179  
Given this large array of institutions, many of which have made reference to R2P in their statements 
or have mechanisms set up which specifically correlate with tenets of the norm, it would seem likely 
that the AU could champion R2P in the region and act as an R2P promoter towards resistant states. 
Paradoxically perhaps considering claims that R2P “emerged, quite literally, from the soil and soul of 
Africa”180, Paul Williams uses Acharya’s norm localisation model to analyse the diffusion of R2P 
within African International Society. Localisation is said to occur when there is “contestation 
between emerging transnational norms and pre-existing regional normative and social orders.”181 
Thus, using the localisation model to assess R2P in Africa is an interesting choice as it assumes that 
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the cognitive priors of the region are not congruent with R2P, an assumption which clashes with the 
claim that R2P emerged from Africa. Thus, despite radical changes in Africa’s peace and security 
architecture, Williams assumes (and rightly so) that the existing normative structure has been left 
unchanged by the AU’s arrival and that African society is still predominantly concerned with non-
interference. If this is the case, in order for R2P to be diffused within Africa its content must be 
fundamentally reconstructed to increase its congruence with existing norms. 
The conflict between Africa’s new peace and security architecture and non-interference is 
embedded within the very framework and legal structures of the African Union. The Constitutive Act 
mandates the African Union with two contradictory principles: it gives it the right to intervene in the 
affairs of another state to uphold peace and security (in Articles 4(h) and (j)), while also tasking the 
organisation with “defend[ing] the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member 
States.”182 To overcome this inherent contradiction the AU’s Constitutive Act, like R2P, places 
limitations on ‘state sovereignty’ making it conditional on “a state’s willingness and capacity to 
provide protection to its citizens.”183 Also similarly to R2P, states seem to have supported this notion 
more rhetorically rather than practically which has led the African Union, like the OAS before it 
unable to respond to the mass atrocities taking place within the continent. 
Initial reactions 
In general, Africa’s reception to R2P is inconsistent between states and throughout time. While 
initial responses differed between acceptance, rejection, and tacit agreements to discuss the 
concept further, many countries have altered their stance towards the norm since.  
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa and Tanzania have 
all been noted as endorsers of R2P, despite the fact that not all of them stated their acceptance or 
explicitly referenced R2P in 2005.184 During the World Summit, Rwanda invoked the wording of R2P 
in relation to terrorism185 before arguing the need to undertake “collective action in a timely and 
decisive manner… and ensure that preventative interventions are the rule rather than the 
exception”186 and Botswana endorsed R2P claiming that we “can no longer afford to stand back if a 
country fails to protect its citizens against grave human *r+ight abuses.”187 Others were slower on 
their endorsement of R2P with countries like Ghana, DRC and Tanzania showing their support of the 
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concept during the first Open Debate on the ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ in December 
the following year.  
Most states’ reception of R2P is not as straight forward as these however and many have fluctuated 
between acceptance and rejection or somewhere in between. South Africa offers one such example. 
During the World Summit the country showed concern for R2P claiming that it needed to be linked 
“to exceptional circumstances so as not to be misused” and required further elaboration by the 
General Assembly.188 President Thabo Mbeki, while not explicitly referencing R2P raised concerns 
with how larger states “use their power to perpetuate the power imbalance in the ordering of global 
affairs.”189 This concern has been a constant theme of South Africa’s comments on R2P since. 
Other states were more critical of R2P. Egypt for example, despite having served on the High Level 
Panel which unanimously endorsed R2P, responded to Kofi Annan’s report On Larger Freedom and 
his attempts to include R2P within UN debates by stating that 
“the theory of the “responsibility to protect” advocated in *Annan’s+ Report will become a 
threat to the principle of national sovereignty of states, and would usher into a new form for 
intervention in their internal affairs”190 
Egypt’s ambassador Maged Abdelaziz argued that the concept of R2P conflicted with the well-
established principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference which were 
enshrined in the UN Charter. For Egypt, the use of force “should be under strict UN authority and in 
accordance with Charter provisions” and should only be used “*i+n cases of violations to 
international law that could constitute a breach to international peace and security.”  Consequently 
Egypt claimed that states did not have a “shared responsibility outside of the responsibility to 
protect its own citizens and the responsibility of the Security Council to address matters of 
international peace and security.”191 
Egypt was not alone in its concerns and Algeria192, Morocco,193 and Zimbabwe194 all made strong 
statements against the inclusion of R2P in the WSO Document due to fears of its infringement on 
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sovereignty and non-interference. Unsurprisingly, given the on-going situation in Darfur, Sudan has 
also been highly critical of R2P since its inception. Initially Sudan accused R2P of being ‘humanitarian 
intervention in disguise’ and has argued that “what we need is not some fancy romantic words to 
dress up the failures of the UN but… serious reforms within the Security Council to achieve the 
wanted paradigm shift of a world that enjoys security and respects human rights and autonomy of 
state’s to run their own affairs.”195 In addition to this, Sudan advocated strongly against R2P in other 
forums and attempted to portray R2P as a ‘trojan horse’ designed to legitimise intervention.196  
These cases show that the reception of R2P varied significantly between states, with some endorsing 
the norm (especially those who had suffered recent mass-atrocities) and others showing more 
caution towards it due to its contradiction with non-interference. While these concerns were 
repeated throughout the developing world, one would assume that given the similarities between 
R2P and the AU’s Constitutive Act, African states would have endorsed the concept, especially given 
that it impeded their sovereignty less than that of their own regional institution. This clearly did not 
happen and shows that despite the desire by many African states to provide ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ the regions cognitive priors could not simply be uprooted by a Constitutive Act. 
 
Part of the initial rejection by African countries could potentially be explained by their anger at the 
failure for the World Summit to instigate any significant UN reforms. Many developing countries had 
called for significant institutional change of the UN leading up to the 2005 Summit and African 
countries had united in a common position (outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus) to argue for 
permanent African representation within the UN Security Council. Given the abrupt end in these 
negotiations and the failure for any significant reforms to be undertaken, it is possible that many 
states felt that endorsing R2P would give “the Security Council the privilege of executor of the 
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represent the cornerstone of any world order.” (King Mohammed VI, 2005) 
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concept of responsibility to protect [which would be like giving] the wolf the responsibility to adopt a 
lam*b+.”197  
Responses to implementation: NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 
The reaction to instances in which R2P has been implemented within Africa, like its reception, has 
generated mixed feelings from states. The African Union “has consistently shown itself unwilling to 
take measures against incumbent leaders and governments”198 which has led many of its responses 
to mass-atrocity crimes to be undertaken with the consultation of the UN, if not entirely by extra-
African states.199 The organisation is guilty of resisting International Criminal Court arrest warrants 
and has been heavily criticised for failing to resolve the on-going conflict which has plagued Sudan 
for over a decade.200 Its responses in Kenya in 2007, which has often been advocated as a successful 
instance of R2P, and in Zimbabwe in 2008, were only marginally better, the AU having simply 
mediated agreements that allowed incumbent rulers to retain a share of their power in order to 
prevent conflict.201  
This pattern of failure has continued to the present day, with guarded responses to conflicts 
resulting from the Arab Spring in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. While R2P has been 
invoked numerous times regarding conflicts within Africa by both local and non-local actors, none 
have illuminated the region’s reception of R2P as clearly as the crisis in Libya in 2011 in which African 
countries, undecided and unaligned with one another, sat back and allowed Western forces to 
intervene and overthrow the Gadhafi regime, a regime with a ruler who had had a particularly high 
standing within Africa and had been one of the strongest voices within the AU, even paying 
membership fees for numerous small states.202 
Libya 
UNSC Resolution 1973 which was passed on 17 March 2011 marked the first time the Security 
Council had “authorised the use of force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a 
functioning state.”203 Bellamy and Williams argue that consensus was enabled by several factors 
which form a ‘new politics of protection’ within the international community. These are primarily; 
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that society is focused explicitly on civilian protection, that the Security Council is willing to authorise 
the use of force for humanitarian protection, and that the Council is willing to consider views held by 
regional arrangements which act as ‘gatekeepers’ influencing the range of issues that get debated, 
how they are framed, and what solutions are proposed.204  
Bellamy and Williams have argued that in Libya “regional organizations played a ‘gatekeeping’ role 
by establishing the conditions under which the Security Council could consider adopting 
enforcement measures.”205They argue that alongside actions by the League of Arab States (LAS), of 
which Libya was also a member, the AU’s Peace and Security Council’s “muted”206 statement 
released on the 23rd of February which condemned the use of force against peaceful protesters207 
“set the context for the Security Council’s discussion on the crisis.”208 While initially the prospects of 
military action against Gadhafi’s regime seemed slim, Bellamy and Williams argue that the 
unwillingness of the regime to respond to demands laid out in resolution 1970,209 the increased calls 
by the UK and France for tougher measures to be undertaken, and finally “the political game-
changer…. *t+he positions taken by relevant regional organizations” changed these prospects.210 
Ultimately Resolution 1973 was passed with the Council noting Libya’s failure of its primary 
responsibility to protect the civilian populations, and it authorised member states “acting nationally 
or through regional organizations or arrangements *to use+ all necessary measures” to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas in Libya, including through the imposition of a no fly zone.211 
This resolution would have failed without the affirmative votes of Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa, 
of which only two would have had to abstain for it to be blocked.212 Fortunately for the people of 
Libya, as Bellamy and Williams point out “LAS activism had more of an impact at the UN Security 
Council than AU caution”213 and the African states went against the AU’s official position and voted 
                                                          
204 Bellamy & Williams, 2011  
205 Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 839 
206 Omorogbe, 2012 
207 This Communiqué condemned the excessive use of force against civilians and the loss of life and 
called for an end to the violence whilst giving support to the people’s democratic aspirations. (AU 
Document : PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI)) 
208 Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 839 
209 Resolution 1970 was the precursor to Resolution 1973. It was adopted on 26 February 2011 and 
condemned the use of lethal force by the regime of Gadhafi against protesters and imposed a series 
of sanctions (see UN Document: SC/10187/Rev.1**). 
210 Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 841 
211 UN Document: SC/RES/1973. para. 1 
212 Such a phenomenon was unlikely considering both Gabon and Nigeria’s positive reception of R2P 
which would have left any tentative condemnation by South Africa ineffective and perhaps 
damaging for the country.  
213 Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 843 
36 | P a g e  
 
in favour of the use of force. While charting the response towards the atrocities that took place 
within Libya in 2011 is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is useful to note that in general, most states 
at least rhetorically, condemned the situation but did not condone a coercive response. While the 
AU eventually supported Resolution 1973 on the 23rd of March, 214 the majority of African states 
were either cautious or against using force which can be inferred by their earlier decision to pass a 
communiqué on the 10th of March which “rejected… external military intervention in Libya, 
whatever its form.”215  
The AU’s actions have been heavily criticised in the past for failing to act in respect of incumbent 
regimes, 216 and its actions during the Libyan crises were no better. Despite the vast array of tools 
that the African Union could have implemented against the Gadhafi regime, not least of all the 
provisions outlined within articles 4(h) and 4(j) of their Constitutive Act as well as the myriad of 
institutional trappings established within their Peace and Security Council to respond to such crises, 
the AU took a cautious approach which favoured a diplomatic solution rather than coercive force 
under R2P. In March 2011, the AU PSC established a High Level Committee on Libya to mediate 
between the fighting groups and proposed a set of ‘roadmaps’ which called for an immediate 
ceasefire to hostilities, the allowance of humanitarian assistance to both groups, protection of 
foreign nationals, and proposed dialogues with both parties in order to bring about the desired 
political reforms to achieve peace.217 Similarly to its stance during election disputes in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, the African Union sought to establish a power-sharing agreement between the Gadhafi 
regime and the rebels Transitional National Council (TNC) rather than overthrowing Gadhafi for 
failing at his R2P.218 These plans, though accepted by Gadhafi, were rejected by the TNC who were 
unwilling to comply with any strategy in which Gadhafi did not cede power.219  
The AU’s failure to implement the numerous provisions in Libya which many African states have 
claimed resonate so closely with R2P shows just how irrelevant the region’s peace and security 
architecture is. On the 25th of March 2011, the ‘African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
unanimously ordered provisional measures towards Gadhafi for the “serious massive violations of 
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rights”220 that had been occurring. Gadhafi failed to comply with these provisions while the AU 
Assembly declined to support the complaints, claiming they would impede efforts to negotiate a 
diplomatic solution,221 showing once again a lack of political will to deal with the incumbent 
leader.222 Furthermore, the African Union blocked the Security Council’s referral of the Libyan crisis 
to the ICC requesting the matter to be deferred in accordance with the Rome Statue.223  
The failure by the AU to implement its responsive provisions against the Gadhafi regime, even in a 
preventative capacity, demonstrates that the organisation’s commitment to the 3rd pillar of R2P 
does not go beyond rhetoric and is at best limited to a case by case assessment. After NATO was 
accused of exceeding its mandate in Libya and seeking to overthrow the Gadhafi regime, the AU’s 
inability to act turned to outright criticism of the events taking place, further placing the Union’s 
commitment to R2P in dispute. After the intervention, the AU’s Commissioner for Peace and Security 
was reported as saying, "I would like to point out that the pursuit of other agendas in Libya, by non-
African actors, has had an impact on the implementation of the AU roadmap."224 The Commissioner 
then proceeded to tell AU foreign ministers that "[a]ttempts have been made to marginalise an 
African solution to the crisis… *which was+ fully consistent with and complementary to UN Security 
Council resolutions."  
After the TNC took control of Tripoli on August 21, 2011, the UN General Assembly found it to be the 
sole representative of Libya with 114 votes favouring the decision, 17 opposing it, and 15 
abstentions. 225  Of the 17 states that refused recognition, 12 originated from Africa226 and justified 
their decision due to the “process, legality and principle” in which UN recognition had been 
granted.227 The African Union did not grant recognition of the TNC until October 20, 2011.228 
Surprisingly, Egypt, perhaps due to the recent changes that had resulted out of its Arab Spring called 
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for the AU’s motion to be rejected on the grounds that it had witnessed Libyan citizens experiencing 
the “most horrifying times” due to its proximity to the region.229  
Two consequences in terms of R2P’s reception by the African community are immediately apparent. 
Strong R2P advocates, such as Botswana, seem to have remained unperturbed by the events that 
occurred and actively commended the military coalition for their actions “in removing Gadhafi and 
his regime.”230 This however was not typical and many R2P cautious states have had their fears 
reaffirmed by the regime change that occurred. South Africa for instance, which had been a 
relatively strong advocate of R2P up until 2011, noted its concerns 
“with the manner in which efforts employed by the Security Council to protect civilians have been exploited in 
the recent past. In particular, my delegation has expressed its condemnation of recent NATO activities in Libya 
which went far beyond the letter and spirit of resolution 1973 ... Abusing the authorization granted by this 
Council to advance political and regime change agenda’s does not bode well for future action by this Council in 
advancing the protecting of civilians agenda *sic+.”
231
 
Concerns over regime change and misuse of R2P have frequented South African statements232, 
however they have grown more prominent since Libya. During the UN interactive dialogue on 
‘Timely and Decisive Response’, South Africa argued that “consensus *for the signing of the WSO 
document] was possible because of what we thought were sufficient checks and balances, 
qualifications to avoid abuse for the political agendas” which were evidently not enough and led to a 
“clear disregard for the need for accountability to the Security Council when non-Member States or 
other organisations outside of the UN are implementing Security Council resolution*s+.”233  
In general, the implementation of R2P in authorising a coercive response to the crisis in Libya has 
either left the reception of R2P by African states unchanged or (as is more often the case) made 
them more wary of pillar 3 activities. In looking at statements from African countries since 2011 it is 
clear that many have become increasingly critical of pillar 3 and have begun to assert more actively 
that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference must be upheld, essentially condemning the 
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very impetus for R2P’s initial inception in 2001. While there has not necessarily been a ‘backslide’ by 
states in their commitment to the norm, the likelihood of future coercive responses being 
authorised by the Security Council or the African Union in the region seems increasingly slim. 
Despite many states outwardly condemning the actions of the Gadhafi regime, R2P has either been 
unable to generate the political will or capacity for African states to respond against one of their 
own and halt mass atrocity crimes, perhaps in part, due to the negative manner in which many of 
these states have received pillar 3. 
Evolving perspectives: Reception of R2P by African states after 2009 
Ban Ki-Moon’s 2009 attempt to reframe R2P within three pillars and emphasise its less contentious, 
‘preventative’ aspects was a deliberate attempt to garner greater support for the norm and changed 
the way in which states received and discussed the norm. Most notably, following Ban Ki-Moon’s 
report, states were able to emphasise aspects of the norm they better empathised with while either 
tacitly accepting the other proponents of R2P or not at all.  
Sierra Leone for example, when reviewing the new approach laid out by Ban Ki-Moon took the 
opportunity to claim that though the report “clearly outlines the three pillars that underlie the 
principle *of R2P+…. [w]e believe these occurrences should be addressed by a solid commitment to 
promoting and advancing preventive measures both at the national and international levels, instead 
of waiting to apply pillar 3 when the situation gets out of hand.”234 Thus, Sierra Leone emphasised its 
desire to promote pillar 1 and 2 during the General Assembly and only later reaffirmed its 
commitment to pillar 3 in an open debate.235  
 
The ‘three pillar’ approach has allowed other states, such as Egypt, to show marginal support for R2P 
all the while expressing concerns for the 3rd pillar. In 2009, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), Egypt made its concerns clear “about the possible abuse of R2P by expanding its application 
to situations that fall beyond the four areas defined in the 2005 [WSO] Document, misusing it to 
legitimise unilateral coercive measures or intervention in the internal affairs of states.”236 Despite 
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Egypt undergoing its own regime change in 2011 and condoning the UN intervention in Libya, 
concerns about pillar 3 have been reiterated since.237 
In spite of Ban Ki-Moon’s insistence in 2009 that R2P rest equally on all three pillars, there has been 
a growing tendency for African states to no longer refer to R2P as a holistic entity, and discussion by 
African states on responses to mass-atrocities has become considerably rarer and less. 
South Africa, while a great supporter of the similar preventative, response, and rebuilding 
proponents laid out within the African Union, became increasingly cautious of R2P as it was 
established within the international community. A constant theme which has been articulated 
throughout South Africa’s statements relating to R2P has been its wariness of abuse from the 
Security Council and powerful extra-African states. In the 2009 debate regarding the Secretary-
General’s report, South Africa argued that “the need for the development of the concept of 
“Responsibility to Protect” is a result of the failure of the UN, specifically the Security Council to 
prevent *mass atrocity crimes+” and that “history is strewn with examples of the abuse of the 
Council’s power.”238 This position has only become more critical recently, as is shown by the 
countries responses to R2P’s implementation such as in Libya. 
Even Ghana, which became one of Africa’s most vocal supporters of R2P,239 has shown a decisive 
shift in emphasis on the R2P norm from a holistic three pillared approach to most often only 
discussing the preventative aspects of the norm.240 In 2009 Ghana’s Ambassador stated that the UN 
needed to more actively support regional and sub-regional organisations before outlining all of the 
African Union’s efforts to institutionalise both the preventative and interventionist aspects of the 
norm (showing support for pillars 1 and 2).241 The Ambassador concluded by stating “*m+y delegation 
believes that in the scheme of the responsibility to protect, prevention must be given top priority” as 
“it is often too late to save the population who are victims of *mass atrocity crimes+.”242 While the 
argument that prevention is more imperative than response is undoubtedly correct (given the order 
in which they occur), later statements by Ghanese officials began to show concerns relating to 
possible abuse of R2P’s third pillar. In 2010 the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alhaji Mumuni noted that  
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“Ghana strongly supports the Principle of the [R2P] as the normative framework to prevent and deter the 
occurrence of [mass atrocity crimes]. While the fear of its abuse does not take away the intrinsic value of the 
principle of the [R2P], caution must be exercised in order to avoid the abuse of the responsibility to protect.”
243 
That same year the Ghanese Ambassador called the prevention of conflicts a “development 
imperative” and emphasised the “urgent need for the international community to grant priority 
attention to the prevention of conflicts around the world.” Since then, Ghana has remained 
relatively silent towards pillar 3 apart from one instance in 2011 when it issued a joint statement 
with Costa Rica and Denmark reemphasising the point that intervention may only occur when a state 
fails at its first two pillars.244   
It is unclear whether Ghana’s shift, following the broader trend of R2P advocates who are focusing 
overwhelmingly on the preventative aspects of R2P, is merely rhetorical in order to seem less 
threatening, or is also instrumental. While it is unlikely that Ghana has shifted away from pillar 3 in 
its entirety, its statements during the UN’s latest informal interactive dialogue on R2P in 2012 does 
not indicate a country taking a strong holistic approach to all of its pillars. The forum, entitled ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect, Timely and Decisive Response’245 was the third debate in an annual 
discussion of R2P concepts and was supposedly meant to focus on the third and final pillar of R2P 
(response). Despite this open invitation for countries to discuss the contentious intervention aspects 
of R2P openly, Ghana did not take this opportunity instead stating 
“*d+espite the focus of the report under review, we think that our primary aim should be the 
prevention of the four capital crimes listed, and thus build relevant time tested governance and legal 
institutions at the national, regional and global levels.”
246 
Nigeria, another vocal advocate of R2P, has also shifted its rhetorical support for pillar 3 increasingly 
focusing on pillars 1 and 2. In 2009, Nigeria strongly affirmed its support to all pillars and that leaders 
had agreed “that when a state is manifestly failing to protect its population from these four crimes, 
the international community has the obligation to take collective action in a timely and decisive 
manner through the Security Council and in accordance with the UN charter.”247 In the years 
following this however, Nigeria’s support or focus has shifted away from the third pillar. In 2010 it 
claimed that “*w+hile giving equal weight to the three main pillars *of R2P+…. we believe that 
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emphasis should be placed on prevention rather than on intervention.”248 In 2011, when pointing 
out how R2P had been inconsistently applied as a response to mass atrocity crimes failing citizens in 
the DRC, Gaza, Syria and Western Sahara, Nigeria argued the need to provide better preventative 
and accountability measures despite the fact that these failings were caused by the lack of a 
consistent framework for intervention.249   
Likewise, Kenya, after thanking the Secretary-General and the international community for their 
implementation and preventative engagement in the country during the General Election disputes in 
2007 surprisingly argued that while the events that occurred in their country show a successful 
instance of R2P implementation, “Necessary measures’ should…not be equated to the “threat of use 
of force”250 and later distanced their commitment to pillar 3 further claiming that “the international 
community must be able to extract compliance from the concerned state without resort to force.”251  
While Rwanda has not necessarily negated its support of pillar 3, it has not clearly or ardently 
advocated it either. In 2007 it reaffirmed R2P252 in the interactive dialogue on ‘Timely and Decisive 
Response’ and delicately claimed that “timely and decisive response does not have to be by military 
means or sanctions alone.”253 Furthermore, while Rwanda has often been one of the most vocal 
supporters of R2P, often drawing links to its tragic history, its on-going activities in the DRC are only 
prolonging the conflict making many of their statements somewhat hypocritical.254  
While there is a growing trend by African states to show their commitment to R2P, with discussion 
and institutional capacity relating to the norm having proliferated since 2005, these activities have 
been increasingly one sided, focusing on prevention or capacity building rather than intervention. 
Since 2009 and the compartmentalization of R2P into 3 pillars, this tendency for states to engage 
with R2P by discussing only pillars 1 and 2 has become more acute. Potentially because it is possible 
to discuss a singular aspect of the norm without necessarily endorsing or rejecting its other 
components, discussion has shifted focus upon the non-contentious preventative aspects of the 
norm with pillar 3 often only being mentioned in passing or in critical remarks. While it is oft pointed 
out that prevention must precede response which can only take place if the former fails, the lack of 
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discussion on intervention, even by advocating states, is potentially empting the norm of its 
responsive utility making coercive response more difficult to talk about let alone implement.  
Findings 
R2P’s reception in Africa has not followed a linear trajectory. States have not either grown to 
embrace or reject the norm throughout time; rather they have shifted their positions toward the 
norm in response to which aspects are emphasised by advocates at the time as well as in response 
to examples of implementation within the region (in particular the NATO intervention in Libya). 
While it is difficult to claim with any certainty whether states are receiving the norm better today 
than they were a few years ago, the amount of discussion that has been generated within the region 
suggests a modest improvement.  
Indeed, African states are often pointing towards the myriad of new institutions which reflect 
components of R2P and advocates seem content to see this as progress towards the norm’s 
diffusion. However, having analysed the initial reception of R2P by African states, as well as the 
discussion surrounding the norm today, one particularly worrying trend has emerged. Where 
outright rejection of R2P due to its infringement on non-interference has become increasingly less 
common by states, so too has constructive discussion relating to the responsive capabilities of the 
norm.  It must be remembered that R2P was initially designed to “bridge the gap between the 
legality and legitimacy of intervention”.  
This general shift away from pillar 3 could indicate that R2P is being ‘localised’ by African states who 
are not only framing the norm preventatively but are slowly, fundamentally altering the norm’s 
ability to respond to conflicts. This seems to be a result of efforts by both local and non-local norm 
entrepreneurs within the region. The argument so often stated by advocating and cautious states 
alike that prevention is at the core of R2P is fast becoming a reality, not only overshadowing but 
overwriting any and all ability to respond to crises. While the number of institutions that have been 
set up to undertake things such as early warning detection have indeed proliferated since 2005, 
these tools have consistently tended towards prevention rather than response capabilities. Similarly, 
African states have consistently shown that they are only willing to resolve conflicts diplomatically 
leading to the region’s inability to quell bloodshed when preventative and diplomatic measures fail. 
The disaster in Libya epitomises this trend, the consequence of which is that when coercive response 
or preventative acts are required, Africa has been unable to deliver. The current conflict in Mali is 
but one instance which demonstrates this point. The country has suffered on going violence by 
insurgent groups since early 2012 and had to call upon foreign aid (in this instance the French 
military) in order to restore order and only later received some support from the AU. As such, it 
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seems that the AU, for all its early support of R2P is unlikely to champion the norm but for its 
preventative aspects, which it operationalises with mixed results. As one commentator has noted, 
“in practice the AU has been unwilling to assume the role that it has carved out for itself. Its history 
to date has been marked by its support for incumbent governments, irrespective of their 
conduct.”255  
  
                                                          
255 Omorogbe, 2012 
45 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 4: Southeast Asia and China, accommodating or ignoring R2P?  
Writing in 2009, Bellamy and Davies argued that “although much of the debate about 
operationalizing R2P has focused on Africa, efforts to progress R2P hinge on the principle’s ability to 
secure a degree of support and acquiescence in the Asia-Pacific region.”256 This they argue, is in part 
because of the sheer size of the populations contained within the region and in part because the 
region hosts many of the world’s fastest growing economies.257 Initial reactions to R2P during the 
2005 World Summit from Southeast Asia were relatively restrained, with some commentators 
arguing that most states ‘tacitly’ supported the concept’s inclusion in the Outcome Document due to 
the fact that they neither endorsed nor verbalised any misgivings or criticism they had with it.258 For 
the most part, Southeast Asia seems to have neither outright rejected nor accepted the norm and 
many states simply remain silent when it is discussed.  
Due to the region’s historically strong commitment to non-interference, studies analysing R2P’s 
reception have focused almost explicitly on the extent to which ‘sovereignty as a responsibility’ and 
the preventative aspects of the norm have been diffused. Commentary on this process is 
contradictory, with some such as Bellamy and Drummond arguing that R2P is slowly being localised 
within the region while others such as Capie argue that while there may be some support for R2P in 
the region “the key aspects of the norm have not yet diffused.”  
Institutional architecture and cognitive priors 
Southeast Asia’s regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was 
established in 1967 and aims to (1) “accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region” as well as (2) “promote regional peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law in… adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.”259 The organisations devotion to non-interference “is characteristic of an institutional 
culture of regional security management that aims to avoid confrontation.”260 Commonly referred to 
as the ‘ASEAN way’, the organisation favours high degrees of consultation and consensus based 
nonbinding agreements which commentators have noted makes “ASEAN’s members reluctant to, or 
incapable of, addressing contentious issues.” 261  The principle of non-interference has been 
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reaffirmed in all of ASEAN’s major agreements262 which were reconfirmed in Article 2(1) of the 
ASEAN Charter signed in 2007. In addition to this, the Charter stipulates in Article 2(2a) that 
members must act with “respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all ASEAN Member States” and Article 2(2k) dictates that members to 
abstain from “participation in any policy or activity…. which threatens the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States.”263 The charter also includes 
provisions seeking to enhance regional development, calling for states to adhere to principles of 
democracy and good governance (Article 2(2h)). 
ASEAN states have been noted for their conscious effort to refrain from building “institutional 
structures that might impinge on the autonomy and sovereignty of individual member states” and 
have deliberately kept ASEAN’s Secretariat “small and relatively powerless.”264 These decisions are a 
result of the region’s colonial legacy as well as several conflicts which have occurred since 
independence, most notably Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979. While some commentators 
have noted that since the late 1990s “ASEAN has permitted increasing levels of political 
commentary, diplomatic pressure and external mediation efforts in relation to domestic affairs of 
some of its member states”,265 states have generally been unwilling to translate good words into 
deeds.  
While the ASEAN Charter is comparable to the AU’s Constitutive Act in that they both have 
provisions reaffirming the regions’ commitments to sovereignty and non-interference, the ASEAN 
Charter does not allude to R2P in any manner (much to the disgruntlement of civil society groups at 
time of the Charter’s writing). Thus, the ASEAN Charter embodies its member’s adherence to non-
interference, ruling the organisation out as a tool to help in R2P’s diffusion within the region.266 As 
one commentator has noted “ASEAN does not have an official position on R2P and has made no 
statement which suggests consideration has been afforded to the ways in which the Association 
might aid the implementation of R2P in Southeast Asia.”267 
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ASEAN is not the only entity which seems to have little interest in promoting R2P within Southeast 
Asia and the norms’ primary entrepreneurs are external actors such as Australia and a myriad of civil 
society groups like the ‘Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect’. 268  
Initial reactions 
The reception of R2P has been largely sporadic within Southeast Asia. While some states such as 
Singapore have received the norm warmly, the majority have expressed concern over its 
infringement on non-interference which has led to considerable problems with its diffusion and 
internalization. In general, most states have been overwhelmingly quiet during discussions relating 
to R2P, so much so that their silence during the final World Summit debates and lack of open 
criticism thereafter has led to some commentators arguing that they have ‘tacitly’ accepted the 
norm269 despite the lack of advocacy or attempts to institutionalise it since.  
Singapore has been perhaps the longest and most vocal supporter of R2P within the region since its 
adoption in 2005. Although expressing initial concern regarding some of the human rights proposals 
that were suggested,270 Singapore ultimately supported R2P and has been openly advocating it since, 
even joining the Canadian led R2P ‘Group of Friends’. This support has not led to blind faith in the 
norm and Singapore has consistently striven to refine R2P and has called for its effective 
implementation within the UN through Security Council reform. 
Indonesia was one of the more ‘tacit’ acceptors of R2P and voiced concern over the concept noting 
that it should express due diligence to the UN Charter but that it “welcomes further discussion on 
improving the text.”271 Indonesia’s President also claimed that “*w+e need a consensus on the 
responsibility to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. To this 
end, force should be used only when all other means have failed.”272 
Most states within Southeast Asia however did not receive R2P so warmly and have generally either 
remained silent in debates, or have voiced their fears relating to the potential for its misuse and the 
loss of sovereignty that would be entailed in its acceptance. While China endorsed R2P in the 2005 
World Summit and allowed for its reaffirmation of Resolution 1674, “it was partly owing to Chinese 
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concerns that the draft World Summit document insisted that all questions relating to the use of 
force would be deferred to the Security Council and that the proposed discussion on criteria to guide 
decision making was omitted.”273 China’s foreign policy, like that most states’ within the region, 
contains a strong commitment to non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states which has 
led to China’s consistent attempts to limit R2P’s infringement on these principles. For instance 
during the summit the Chinese President Hu Jintao insisted that “we should all oppose acts of 
encroachment on other countries’ sovereignty, forceful interference in a country’s internal affairs, 
and wilful use or threat of military force.”274 These concerns have since been reiterated frequently 
by Beijing, which has consistently emphasised that “external assistance should be carried out with 
the prerequisite that the will of the government concerned be respected, its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity be preserved and that no arbitrary intervention be imposed on the government 
concerned over its objection.”275 China’s reluctant endorsement of the norm may have been 
carefully weighted by what it sees as its growing role in the international system. Thus, where China 
had openly argued against acts of intervention in the past due to its strict adherence of non-
interference, its acceptance of R2P cannot be considered similar to the way in which other Western 
nations have endorsed R2P. Instead its failure to reject R2P outright could demonstrate China’s 
desire to partake in global discussion and help shape the content of norms such as R2P so that they 
are more aligned with its own interest.   
Many other states within the region have shared China’s concerns. Malaysia for instance sought to 
ensure “that the use of force is applied only as an instrument of last resort”.276 While not explicitly 
rejecting or accepting R2P, it reaffirmed that “any intervention must give due recognition to [UN] 
Charter principles pertaining to sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. While the 
Security Council would appropriately be the body to take decisions on these matters, it is Malaysia’s 
view that provisions must also be made for the General Assembly to have an oversight rule… 
[considering the need to] guard against abuse and double standards in their application].277 When 
speaking on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), Malaysia “stresse*d+ that these elements, 
ideas, norms, concepts and proposals [such as R2P] should be further discussed in greater detail by 
the General Assembly with a view to achieving consensual acceptance by the larger UN 
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membership.”278 Malaysia has also stressed the importance of “the need to preserve and promote 
*the UN Charter’s+ principles and purposes, including the principles of respect for the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States” and “observed the 
similarities between the new expression ‘responsibility to protect’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’” 
and requested that this be examined closely in terms of its implications on aforementioned 
principles.279 
Where China toed the line between accepting R2P and attempting to ensure that the norm would 
not authorise action taken against the will of sovereigns, other states within Southeast Asia did not 
afford the norm this same degree of acceptance. Myanmar while not openly referring to R2P in its 
statement during the World Summit, did claim that the “sacrosanct principles of national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, settlement of disputes 
by peaceful means, and non-use of force or threat of force” were the “guiding principles that have 
withstood the test of time and are as relevant and valid today as on the day they were adopted”280 
which would seem incompatible with the norm of R2P. This position has been reaffirmed more 
strongly in relation to R2P since. 
While most states within the region have cautiously followed R2P’s progression, some have had 
more observable reactions to the norm. The Philippines for instance, which was labelled as an R2P 
supporter by Bellamy and Davies in 2009 due to its endorsement of R2P in the lead up to the World 
Summit,281 gradually reduced its support of the norm to the point that it resisted Security Council 
attempts to have R2P reaffirmed immediately after the World Summit282 and apart from a statement 
released in 2009 has “studiously avoided the use of R2P language” since.283 While the Philippines 
shows perhaps the most clear cut example of an inconsistent reception towards R2P within 
Southeast Asia, it is useful to note that part of the reason for this refraction can be explained by the 
increasing concern that the international community has expressed with the Philippines own human 
rights issues in areas such as Mindanao, and the country’s desire to ensure its sovereignty is not 
infringed upon in response to this.284  
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After the World Summit, R2P was invoked countless times in UN bodies and forums. 2006, 2007, and 
2008 saw numerous Security Council debates on the ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, 
‘Threats to International Peace and Security’, and debates on crises in areas such as Sudan and 
Myanmar, many of which paid heed to the then ‘emerging norm’. These invocations were 
undertaken by states all across the world, with even some ‘reluctant’ Southeast Asian states 
discussing the concept. To some commentators such as ‘International Coalition for the Responsibility 
to Protect’, these discussions show examples of states reaffirming their commitment to R2P.285 For 
example, Bellamy and Davies argue that comments from China and Vietnam in this period allow 
them to be categorised as having accepted R2P and being ‘engaged’ with the norm despite their 
constant attempts to limit or negate its controversial aspects. 
During the period of 2006 to 2009 two large changes to R2P’s reception occurred within Southeast 
Asia. The Philippines regressed significantly from its earlier pro-R2P stance, and Vietnam dropped its 
outright rejection of R2Pand, according to Bellamy and Davies, affirmed its commitment to it.286 
Other than these two cases, the four years following R2P’s inclusion in the WSO document did not 
demonstrate any significant change of R2P’s reception within the region. While the phrase 
“responsibility to protect” was invoked numerous times by states within Asia during the summits 
that took place, states’ receptions of the norm remained the same. The act of ‘reaffirming’ a 
commitment to R2P often prefaced a subtle criticism and attempt to constrain the parameters of the 
norm (a trend which has continued to this day). For example, during debates on ‘The Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (28th June 2006, 4th December 2006, 22nd June 2007, 27th May 2008 and 
14th January 2009) China’s stance towards R2P remained constant, and each time it ‘reaffirmed’ its 
commitment to the norm287 before claiming that discussions on R2P should take place within the 
General Assembly not the Security Council due to the need for open transparent debates to take 
place amongst all members, many of whom still had reservations regarding the norm (including 
China).  
Whether these reiterations of R2P wording were in fact states reaffirming their commitment to R2P 
is debatable, what is un-contentious however is that the majority of these statements showed an 
unwavering commitment to the principles of non-interference and a concern by Southeast Asian 
nations that the norm could be misused. Vietnam for example, after ‘reiterating’ the view that states 
bear the primary R2P, claimed that any preventative capacity building efforts undertaken by the UN 
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“should respect national sovereignty, territorial integrity, ownership and self-determination.”288 
However, to states like China these speech acts were more than simply throwing the international 
community a rhetorical bone and while they may not demonstrate much of an actual commitment 
to R2P, such statements signify attempts by these countries to discuss and redefine the content of 
R2P. Indeed it may be the case that many states within the Global South feel that in order to have 
their concerns about R2P heard by its advocates, they must first demonstrate that they know what 
R2P is and show their commitment to it. Ultimately, as has been oft noted, Southeast Asian nations 
initially received R2P with extreme caution primarily due to its links with humanitarian intervention 
and its infringement on non-interference.  
Responses to implementation 
In general, Southeast Asian states’ reception of R2P has worsened after attempts by the 
international community to implement the norm’s 3rd pillar. While it has yet to be successfully 
invoked in the region, following Cyclone Nargis in 2008 some non-local actors such as France and the 
European Union attempted to raise R2P against the Myanmar government which was seen to be 
blocking relief efforts from the international community. While this attempt was eventually rebuked 
due to the nature of the crisis not falling within the four crimes of R2P, this event offers perhaps the 
best (if only) case study to analyse the regions reception to attempts to implement R2P’s 3rd pillar 
locally.  
Myanmar 
Myanmar has suffered on-going conflict and human rights abuses since the 1960s, and last decade 
saw the international community attempt to respond forcefully to these violations twice; both times 
being rebuffed by a combination of local and non-local actors. The first instance was in 2007 when a 
resolution was proposed to respond to human rights abuses being carried out against protesters 
from the ‘Saffron’ revolution. This attempt did not explicitly invoke R2P and was ultimately vetoed 
by Russia and China who argued that it fell within the internal affairs of the sovereign state.289 The 
second instance was in response to Cyclone Nargis which struck the country on the 2nd and 3rd of 
October 2008 leaving over 138,000 dead or missing in its wake and a relief effort that far surpassed 
the capabilities of the Myanmar state.290 
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While the Myanmar government initially indicated that it would welcome relief supplies from the 
international community291 the authorities obstructed and hindered relief efforts by restricting 
access to particular areas and delaying the issuing of visas which exacerbated the already dire 
situation on the ground.292  After international attempts to apply pressure on the Myanmar 
government to allow greater access into the country failed293 the French Foreign Minister, Bernard 
Kouchner, invoked R2P and argued that the “primary responsibility is with the government of 
Myanmar, but if it fails or if it cannot, we have to do something. If we do not do anything people will 
continue to die, epidemics will spread out, and it will be a disaster.”294 Despite France’s inability to 
answer which of the four crimes Myanmar had committed,295 this call gained support from some 
other non-local actors such as the European Union which argued that Myanmar’s inaction during the 
first three weeks after the cyclone amounted to neglect and was “arguably a crime against 
humanity” couching it clearly within the framework of R2P.296 
Several other Western governments and human rights commentators released statements 
supporting this assessment; most notably one of R2P’s greatest proponents Lloyd Axworthy argued 
that  
“the fundamental message of R2P is that there is no moral difference between an innocent person 
being killed by machete or AK-47 and starving to death or dying in a cholera epidemic that could have 
been avoided by proper international response *sic+.”
297  
While this attempt to invoke R2P led to an outcry from other advocates and R2P wary states alike,298 
the initial attempt to expand R2P’s mandate beyond the four crimes laid out in Resolution 1674 
could have damaged the norm’s reception within the region, as one analyst has noted “*c+areless 
interpretation of R2P and talk of military intervention after Cyclone Nargis could have further 
weakened efforts to build the institutions necessary to better prevent and protect populations.”299  
The attempt to frame this situation within the parameters of R2P was blocked by states outside of 
Southeast Asia as well as from within, notably China, Indonesia, and Vietnam.300 Chinese officials 
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argued that “*t+he current issue of Myanmar is a natural disaster. It’s not an issue for the Security 
Council. It might be a good issue for other forums of the UN” and Beijing said it would block further 
efforts to resolve the issue through the Security Council, stressing the need to “take full 
consideration of Myanmar’s willingness and sovereignty.”301 Indonesia also argued that “there are 
better forums to discuss the humanitarian dimension of the Myanmar situation” and that “the last 
thing we would want is to give a political spin to the technical realities and the situation on the 
ground.”302 Instead ASEAN surprisingly took the helm in negotiating with the military junta and due 
to the special efforts of Thailand’s Supreme Commander “successfully interceded to help secure 
Myanmar’s consent” to receive aid.303 
Despite the unsuccessful attempt to invoke R2P in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, several analysts 
have argued that its misuse by various advocates pressured ASEAN into action304 and claimed that its 
invocation “played an important part in addressing the crisis more effectively, namely as a rhetorical 
device.”305 They argue that the misuse of R2P in Myanmar showed that “the underlying idea of 
sovereignty as responsibility is widely accepted” within the region306 and that R2P “should not be 
viewed as the protection of everyone from everything… demonstrate*ing+ why the norm cannot be 
applied to widely*sic+.”307 
 A more sceptical analysis of these events could claim that the situation in Myanmar only reaffirmed 
what was already established in Resolution 1674; R2P applies to four crimes and not environmental 
catastrophes. Indeed one of the dangers of misusing the norm during the Myanmar situation was 
that calls for its implementation potentially invoked a conception of R2P that had been rejected at 
the 2005 World Summit. The original ICISS document justified the use of R2P for environmental 
catastrophes, of which the situation in Myanmar fell. The fear from R2P wary states then may have 
been exacerbated by the realisation that any expansion of when R2P applies could have reverted the 
norms content to a version that had not been agreed upon by the international community, and had 
been significantly changed since.   
Badescu and Weiss argue that “part of the political support at the World Summit reflected an 
understandable but erroneous desire to use R2P to mobilise more support for root-cause 
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prevention, or investments in economic and social development” and that the instance of Myanmar 
may have served to prevent broadening the perspective of what R2P is.308 While this is an intriguing 
counter-factual and R2P may indeed have been somewhat clarified during the 2008 incident, 
ultimately pillar 1 has been expanded out to include a broad array of activities as advocates seek to 
increase R2P acceptance within the region.309 Furthermore it is not totally clear whether the misuse 
of R2P by France and other Western nations did not negatively impact on the reception of norm 
within the region. As Singapore noted during the 2009 Interactive Dialogue on R2P: 
“*f+or R2P to become an international norm that can deter impunity and thus prevent such crimes, it 
cannot be tarnished by suspicions of domestic agendas or worse still, political grandstanding. I say this 
because since 2005, there have been efforts by some to misuse the concept of R2P by applying it to 
situations which are clearly outside its scope. For instance, some have tried to link R2P to 
humanitarian access in the wake of natural disasters. This is patently unhelpful.”
310  
While Singapore did not backslide in its commitment to R2P or go so far as to say R2P was damaged 
by its misuse in 2008, it did not claim that the crisis helped us to better understand when R2P is 
applicable either. The constant reiterations by states within the region since 2008 which have 
expressly outlined how R2P only applies to the four crimes outlined in the WSO Document 
potentially signify that some states’ concerns over the impetus for R2P grew due to this misuse. 
Unsurprisingly Myanmar has been overtly critical of this incident.311 
Developing receptions and contribution to R2P debate 
After 2005, Southeast Asian states’ receptions to R2P have remained relatively constant with most 
perceiving the norm in much the same manner as they did during its first four years. Ban Ki-Moon’s 
2009 report gave states an opportunity to discuss the 3 pillars as individual components, rather than 
discussing the norm in its entirety. Perhaps the earliest and most significant change in terms of 
reception following this report came from the Philippines who, for the first time since the World 
Summit, announced its adherence and support for the norm. However this statement was followed 
by an articulation of the many concerns which had perhaps caused it to distance itself from the 
norm in the first place312 as it argued that “collective action” must be applied in strict accordance 
with the UN Charter and that R2P should only apply to the four crimes set out in the WSO 
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document.313 Myanmar too made reference to R2P during the 2009 General Assembly debates, 
perhaps in relation to the 2008 crises, stressing that R2P created an obligation “not to intervene but 
rather to take timely and decisive steps to save human lives when such atrocities occurred” and 
reiterated that R2P applies only to the four crimes.314 
Such concerns have been echoed by other states within the region since 2005, most notably by 
China whose comments have always stressed that the government of a given state bears the 
primary R2P, that sovereignty and the UN Charter must be adhered to, and that more discussion 
needs to take place within the General Assembly to reach a consensus on the norm’s content.315 
While China’s position towards R2P has remained relatively constant, it has elaborated slightly on its 
initial positions over time. In 2009 China began to stress the importance of using other frameworks 
to consider the protection of civilians within conflict. It urged the international community to use the 
full range of tools that are available under international law rather than relying explicitly on R2P316 
and claimed that “*c+onflict situations vary, and there must be no one-size-fits all approach to the 
protection of civilians. Various parties still hold divergent views on the [R2P], and the General 
Assembly should continue its discussion on this matter.”317 This statement reflects China’s opinion 
that R2P’s application should not be expanded beyond the four crimes outlined in the WSO 
Document, a sentiment felt by all states within the region which has been expressed increasingly 
since 2009. China has also stressed that the Security Council should focus more on preventing 
conflicts by engaging with parties through diplomacy before they start fighting and should “not view 
the protection of civilians in isolation.”318 While none of these attitudes are necessarily new, they do 
reaffirm China’s position as wary of R2P and China’s efforts to ensure that the norm is not expanded 
beyond what was originally laid out in 2005. 
Malaysia’s statements from 2009 to 2012 also offer no improvement to the norm’s reception. In 
2009 Malaysia argued that describing R2P “is much like describing the wind- you know it, but you 
can never really pin down its description to a T”319 referring to the disagreement surrounding the 
norm’s content and application. In 2012 this position had not changed and during an interactive 
dialogue on R2P Malaysia argued that “R2P is still a relatively new concept, one that requires greater 
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deliberation. The principle would need to be understood in the same way by all parties… Judging 
from previous debates on the matter, this is certainly not the case.”320 
While Southeast Asian nations have not been as outspoken towards R2P as critics within other 
regions such as Africa, most states negatively received the norm due to their adherence to non-
interference. One tenet of Ban Ki-Moon’s report was to suggest the establishment of early warning 
detection systems to increase the preventative capabilities of regions. To many Southeast Asian 
states, this, like pillar 3, was conceived of as directly interfering with their sovereign rights and talks 
regarding this proposal have been consistently negated or side lined by Southeast Asian nations 
since.321 
Apart from the consistent attempt to restrain R2P, Southeast Asian nations can be seen to have 
contributed to R2P discussions in two ways. First, during a United Nations meeting on Working 
Methods, several governments including two from Southeast Asia, argued against the Security 
Council’s use of veto to block responses to mass atrocity crimes. Singapore argued that “whatever 
divisions there may be among the P-5,322 they are united in having no limits placed on their use or 
abuse of the veto” and thus considered their moral outrage over situations like Syria as 
“hypocritical.”323 Likewise Malaysia argued that “the use of veto has led us all into a deadlock on 
how the international community should address the bloodshed in various regions, especially in the 
Middle East.”324 The desire to ensure the permanent members of the Security Council do not use 
their right to veto during instances in which R2P is applicable could be taken as a positive sign that 
some states have begun to diffuse R2P’s 3rd pillar, however a more critical assessment might 
conclude that such statements simply reflect the broader desire by states within the region to 
ensure that the concept is not misused and is applied consistently by the international community all 
the while reflecting their unhappiness with the continuing failure of UN reform. 
Another noticeable trend which emerges from analysing Southeast Asia’s reception to R2P is the 
steady expansion of what constitutes ‘preventative’ capacity building by both local and non-local 
actors. Ban Ki-Moon’s efforts in 2009 placed greater emphasis on addressing ‘root cause prevention 
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and capacity building’ or pillar 1 and 2 activities, which has shifted the focus of R2P away from pillar 
3 activities significantly. This deliberate shift in emphasis was reaffirmed by R2P advocates in their 
attempts to garner greater support for the norm by no longer using human security language which 
had raised ‘red flags’ and caused states to become more wary of it.325 Instead, norm entrepreneurs 
stressed the preventative aspects of the norm which, according to Capie, has seen R2P associated 
with “an astonishingly broad range of activities… These include among other things: ‘economic 
development’, ‘Reform of the UN and Security Council’, ‘peace operations’, and concern with ‘small 
arms and light weapons’.”326 These efforts have been picked up on by some states within the region 
who have been able to increase their perceived adherence to R2P by undertaking these activities. 
For example, Vietnam which has for the most part been critical of R2P since 2005327 argued in 2009 
that “we have always maintained that the best way to protect the population is to prevent wars and 
conflicts and to address the root causes of conflicts and social tensions, which lie in poverty and 
economic underdevelopment… *c+ultural and religious tensions”328 and in 2012 argued how it is 
“immensely important to promote education” to prevent these crimes.329 Despite this expansion of 
pillar 1 activities, pillar 2 still remains contentious and suggestions about its implementation are 
often followed by reaffirming that such activities should only be undertaken with consent.330  
In 2009 it was claimed that “*t+here is almost no support for the reactive – in particular the coercive 
military – component of the third pillar of R2P” and this assessment has not changed since.331 
Ultimately, time has not afforded R2P a significant improvement in support from Southeast Asian 
states.  
Findings 
Over seven years have passed since the World summit in which R2P was unanimously endorsed, and 
for many within Southeast Asia their initial concerns regarding the norm have not dissipated in any 
significant manner. Southeast Asia’s commitment to R2P remains sporadic and it appears to be 
invoked more rhetorically by states who continue to express little desire to implement the norm 
within their regional institutions. 
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While efforts to diffuse R2P have increased since the refinement of the concept into three pillars in 
2009, much of this has come from civil society groups who tactically switched their emphasis to the 
norms first pillar. Recently observers including members of civil society and academics have noted 
that R2P may slowly be undergoing a process of localisation within the region and that there is a 
growing acceptance by states to conceive of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and criticise human rights 
abuses. While ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis demonstrates an instance of states applying 
pressure on a government to address an internal crisis, this does not necessarily demonstrate that a 
broader notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ is being accepted. After all, the idea of applying R2P 
to the crisis was roundly rejected and the pressure applied on the Myanmar government to allow 
better access for relief workers was in response to a humanitarian crisis rather than a conflict. 
Furthermore ASEAN’s desire to gain authorisation for relief efforts impeded on Myanmar’s 
sovereignty less than the alternative, as some states were considering a more forceful approach to 
delivering aid.332 
States have continued to show reluctance in discussing R2P in any constructive manner, especially 
pillars 2 and 3, even within the UN where states would normally attempt to appear as if they are 
complying with ‘universal’ concepts.333 This approach by Southeast Asian nations extends out to the 
institutionalisation of the norm, where most states and much of the regional architecture largely 
omit any mention of R2P.334 While in more recent years a growing number of Human Rights 
organisations have emerged, these are more likely occurring as a result of internal changes to the 
region and are not emerging in a linear way or showing any sign that the region is ready to talk 
about coercive intervention. 
In conclusion, Southeast Asian states have not received R2P consistently or comprehensively and 
appear to be, in large, ignoring it. The tendency for non-local advocates to emphasise the 
preventative aspects of R2P has been reflected by local states who, when they do discuss R2P, rarely 
talk about pillar 2 or 3 activities. Furthermore, norm entrepreneurs, in their efforts to increase 
                                                          
332 For example France and the United States were both considering forceful measures of getting 
relief efforts such as Para dropping aid.   
333 Coleman, 2011 
334 It must be noted that there has been a growing interest towards human rights in the region in 
recent years and in 2009 ASEAN signed a Human Rights Declaration and established the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. While these acts reflect a growing awareness and 
desire to conform to human rights standards, as Capie (2012) argues, these have not necessarily 
resulted from attempts to diffuse R2P. Rather, the nonlinear and cumbersome fashion in which they 
have emerged suggests that they have resulted due to internal pressures from within the region 
such as Indonesia’s liberalisation and Myanmar’s recent reforms. While these events may eventually 
increase the congruence between the region and R2P, there has been little attempt by local actors 
to link these with R2P to date and states are still unwilling to discuss the responsive capacity of R2P.    
59 | P a g e  
 
congruence have expanded the size of the first pillar to include a large variety of good governance 
activities which seem to be ‘watering down’ the norm. While these R2P-related activities could be 
seen as ‘addressing the root causes of conflict’ which, according to Bellamy and Drummond, could 
signify an accommodation between the principles of “R2P and non-interference”; it is more likely 
that the accommodation is occurring between what local and non-local actors conceive of R2P as, 
which in its current state is increasingly becoming a norm about prevention.  
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Chapter 5: Latin America’s unwavering indifference to R2P 
Latin America is a region which suffers from large-scale disagreement between states regarding 
historical-narratives and economic and development models. 335  There is also a large degree of 
mistrust between states which continue to have out-dated models of security and strictly adhere to 
a traditional conceptualisation of sovereignty, with a strong emphasis on non-interference. Like the 
other developing regions analysed by this thesis, this commitment to non-interference is likely 
caused by the region’s colonial legacy, but may have been exacerbated by the hegemonic role of the 
United States in the region. 
Unlike other developing regions however, Latin America is viewed as being relatively peaceful and 
has suffered few breaches of sovereignty by interstate conflicts in the last hundred and sixty years. 
This is in part due to the variety of doctrines that deny states the right to use force to back up 
commercial disputes which have added to the strict adherence to non-interventionism. 336 
Furthermore, while the region has suffered gross violations of human rights in its recent past, these 
have not amounted to the scale of genocides which occurred in other regions of the world. When 
these abuses did occur, states were able to prevent outside interference and humanitarian 
intervention from the international community largely due to the influence of the United States’ 
Monroe Doctrine.337  
Institutional architecture and cognitive priors 
External intervention was and continues to be “one of the most feared threats to national 
sovereignty” in the region, thanks in part, to early European colonialism and later United States 
hegemony.338 Consequently, Latin America, like Southeast Asia, is a region which strongly adheres to 
the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. In addition to this, there is a relatively high 
degree of mistrust between states and though the region has certainly improved its human rights 
commitment in the last decade, some states such as Nicaragua and Venezuela have notoriously bad 
reputations for committing abuses, 339 and are unsurprisingly extremely critical of R2P. All of these 
aspects have created a regional culture or cognitive priors which starkly contrast the tenets of R2P, 
making diffusion relatively difficult to achieve. As such, literature that has attempted to analyse the 
diffusion of R2P within the region has suggested that “special attention should be directed to avoid 
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considering *its+ reactive dimension”340 so as not to exacerbate fears of misuse. Thus, despite a 
century of relative peace, one would assume that R2P might have a better chance of gaining 
acceptance if it was “localised”. 
One important point to note for Latin America is that there is currently no immediate threat of 
violence within the region which, to many, has made the norm seem largely irrelevant. Perhaps 
because of this, a significant portion of states have accepted R2P to a certain extent341 and while the 
majority remain steadfast in their commitment to neither openly endorsing or criticising R2P, thanks 
to the efforts from various global society groups, dialogue on the norm is increasing.  Non-local 
proponents such as the Eastwest Institute and the Stanley Foundation are the largest advocates of 
R2P within the region, and while some states such as Argentina have been enthusiastically 
supporting the norm since its inception, most discussion has been generated by international actors 
during a variety of conferences they have held in the last couple of years.342 
Latin American’s primary regional organisation is the Organisation of American States (OAS) which 
was founded in 1948 and mandated with comparable tasks to ASEAN, such as strengthening peace 
and security and  promoting and consolidating representative democracy “with due respect for the 
principle of non-intervention.”343 One of the primary reasons for the creation of this organisation has 
been reported as being to ensure the foundation of “strict non-intervention and the total 
abnegation of the use of force.”344 Such tenets are outlined in Chapter IV of OAS Charter which 
claims that “*n+o State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State”345 and that   
“*t+he territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military 
occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any 
grounds whatever.”
346 
The OAS Charter makes only a tacit remark towards human rights which, unlike the AU’s Charter, 
cannot conceivably be regarded as diminishing the regions doctrine of non-intervention.347 However, 
recently a host of mechanisms have been set up within the OAS and the Caribbean Community 
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(CARICOM) such as the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
which some have noted “offer an elaborate regional framework for the protection of human rights 
that should, in theory, contribute to the preventative elements of R2P.”348 While these organisations 
received a small degree of enthusiasm from various Latin American states, the likelihood of the OAS 
becoming a norm champion and strongly advocating R2P in the region is remote as many states 
criticise it for being U.S. centric already349 and typically use the UN to negotiate peaceful settlements 
amongst each other because of this.  
Initial reactions 
The initial response to R2P from Latin American states was, as in other regions, a mixture of 
endorsement, rejection, or agreement to discuss the concept further. Just as in Africa and Southeast 
Asia, many Latin American states were concerned with R2P due to its conflict with the norm of non-
interference. Those who did endorse the concept right away often had assisted in its drafting, were 
some of its strongest advocates in the lead up to 2005, and according to some commentators were 
able to influence a relatively positive reception to the norm within the region.350 
Argentina, has been one of the norm’s strongest advocates since its inception and endorsed the 
WSO Document stating that the “R2P is an appropriate normative framework for responding to 
situations such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.” 351 
Furthermore, Argentina sought to constructively engage with some of the concerns that had been 
raised against the norm and challenged the reasons states had given for dissent.352 In addition to 
this, Argentina agreed with Peru’s suggestion that a paragraph should be included calling on the 
Permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using their veto in situations of 
genocide.353  
Other states, such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Panama have also been consistent in their positive 
reception of the norm. Chile embraced the concept as a ‘continuum of responses’,354 as did 
Colombia which emphasised that regional organisations should be used to create the framework for 
its implementation. 355 Mexico’s response to R2P was also largely positive and it proposed additional 
language in which it sought to strengthen the concept to include “prevention and international 
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assistance, including development and capacity building.” Panama also endorsed R2P, but rather 
tacitly in 2005, claiming more discussion was needed before it could become operational. This 
endorsement quickly solidified in the following years, and during an open debate in 2007 Panama 
affirmed its commitment to R2P in its entirety stating that  
“It is our understanding that the responsibility to protect implies that, over and above the principles 
of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, when a State 
or, to phrase it more aptly, its governmental institutions are unwilling or unable to meet their 
responsibility to protect he human rights of their citizens, it is up to the international community, and 
the United Nations in particular, to adopt timely and decisive collective measures to do so.”
356 
Other states’ concerns were not so quick to dissipate however. Brazil for example, stated that while 
it supported the R2P definition in the Draft Outcome Document it did so only as a “basis for further 
improvement.” Like many other wary Latin American states, Brazil had trouble accepting a norm 
which might diminish sovereignty. At the World Summit Brazil it claimed that 
“We have been called upon to deal with new concepts such as “human security” and “responsibility 
to protect”. We agree that they merit an adequate place in our system. But it is an illusion to believe 
that we can combat the dysfunctional politics at the root of grave human rights violations through 
military means alone, or even economic sanctions, to the detriment of diplomacy and persuasion… 
The United Nations was not created to disseminate the notion that order should be imposed by 
force.”
357  
Jamaica which spoke on the behalf of the G-77358 attempted to propose a new paragraph which 
would emphasise strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity359 while 
CARICOM countries welcomed “the opportunity to discuss the concept further” claiming that they 
could potentially support it if “necessary safeguards *were+ put in place to ensure respect for the 
principles set forth in Charter and international law.”360 In the same vein, Haiti affirmed the norm 
but stressed the need for emphasis upon the preventative capacity and argued that the United 
Nations should “fully respect… the sovereignty of all Member States” when undertaking its duties. 361 
Guatemala too emphasised the importance of prevention in 2007 and in a later forum reaffirmed 
the need for responses to be undertaken “in keeping with State sovereignty and in accordance with 
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guidelines provided by the Government in question.”362 These states, although cautious and 
unwilling to accept the norm immediately have since softened their positions towards it. 
Other countries have not been so welcoming. While the Latin American region had some of the most 
supportive statements towards R2P, comparable to those made by countries such as Rwanda, they 
also had some of most hostile responses, notably from Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 
These states perceive R2P as a tool for Western hegemony and reject every aspect of the norm 
including the way in which it was ‘unanimously’ agreed upon. Cuba for instance rejected the attempt 
to ‘impose acceptance of R2P’ upon the assembly and claimed that R2P would only “facilitate 
interference, pressure and intervention in the domestic affairs of our States by the superpowers and 
their allies.”363 Venezuela too claimed that R2P would only serve the interests of powerful states364 
and argued  
“Today we claim from the peoples, in this case the people of Venezuela, a new international 
economic order, but it is also eminent a new international political order, let’s not allow a handful of 
countries try to reinterpret with impunity the principles of the International Law to give way to 
doctrines like “Preemptive War”, how do they threaten us with preemptivewar!, and the now so 
called “responsibility to Protect, but we have to ask ourselves who is going to protect us, how are 
they going to protect us.”*SIC+
365 
Ultimately the initial responses to R2P within Latin America were relatively comparable with those of 
other developing regions, with a mixture of states that have embraced and consistently reaffirmed 
their commitment to the norm and states that were reluctant to endorse the concept in its entirety 
given their concerns of intervention. While those that rejected R2P were considerably more hostile 
than states in Southeast Asia had been and actively opposed the norm, the states that endorsed the 
concept did so with high praise leading to most in the region receiving the norm, at least rhetorically, 
rather warmly.  
One thing to note in regards to Latin American receptions of R2P was the time frame in which these 
states discussed the norm. Most states voiced their acceptance or dissent of the norm during or 
immediately after the 2005 World Summit, and apart from those that felt strongly towards or 
against R2P, did not mention it again until the 2009 General Assembly. To this, commentators have 
noted that “Latin American and Caribbean countries are currently more concerned by the potential 
impact of the eruption of social violence and of internal political crisis as the main source of 
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potential threats to their stability and regional peace.” 366  Thus this seeming indifference towards 
R2P, which is demonstrated by the dearth of references to it in the years after the World Summit, 
can be partially attributed to the perception held by many states that R2P is not particularly relevant 
within their region.  
Responses to implementation 
Fortunately for Latin America, the region has not suffered a recent incidence in which the 
international community has needed to invoke the concept of R2P in a responsive capacity, and thus 
the general lack of dialogue on R2P has not been at the expense of civilian’s lives. There seems to be 
a general acknowledgement by R2P advocates and civil society groups that Latin America is relatively 
peaceful in comparison to other areas of the world such as Africa,367 and despite the large number of 
human rights abuses that have been carried out in the regions recent past, today’s conflicts tend to 
be more societal violence perpetuated by the large number of paramilitary groups in the region 
rather than large scale attacks on populations carried out by governments. These atrocities are often 
relatively small scale and do not fall under R2P’s parameters. Despite this some have attempted to 
invoke R2P in order to generate greater support for local efforts to halt such atrocities, highlighting 
how international “cooperation offers a positive contribution … when facing the fulfilment of 
obligations to confront criminal phenomena of transnational impact” such as the “trafficking of 
illegal arms, ammunition and explosives.”368 While such attempts have not necessarily sought to 
expand R2P’s applicability, they have reaffirmed the need for early warning detection systems which 
were referred to by Ban Ki-Moon as a way of improving R2P’s preventative capability.  
Given the lack of R2P related threats within the region it is unsurprising that Latin American 
countries discussion on pillar 3 implementation has, in general, remained relatively unchanged since 
2005.369 When states have commented on the norm’s implementation in other areas of the world, 
their statements have more or less reflected their views on R2P as a whole, with advocate countries 
supporting implementation and rejectionist countries remaining critical of it.  
                                                          
366 Serbin & Rodrigues, 2011, p. 267 
367 See for example (Kenkel, 2010, 2012; Serbin & Rodrigues, 2011) 
368 Blum, 2009 
369 While perceptions of R2P’s implementation have remained fairly consistent from 2005 to 2013, 
the region has introduced one notable contribution to discussion on the responsive capacity of the 
norm. The “Responsibility while Protecting” which was submitted to the UN in 2011 by the Brazilian 
delegation is discussed in the next section. 
66 | P a g e  
 
For example, many countries within Latin America such as Chile,370 Guatemala,371 and Panama372 
condemned the actions of the Gadhafi regime in 2011 when it was seen to have violated its citizen’s 
rights and commended the actions of the Security Council in its response.  States that had been 
consistently opposed to R2P such as Cuba, Nicaragua373 and Venezuela374 on the other hand were 
less receptive of the Council’s decision. For instance, Cuba held the view that the NATO led Libyan 
intervention demonstrated how easily R2P can be manipulated with coercive intervention having 
been used before “exhausting all diplomatic instruments, and without even trying to use peaceful 
means”375 which is similar to the view held by many African states (such as South Africa). These 
critical states also aligned with the African Union in refusing to recognise the Transnational Council 
as the representative of Libya, saying it had been ‘pushed to the fore’ by NATO which had “no legal 
or moral authority to decide who should govern a nation.”376 
Those states that had been cautious in embracing R2P but had not outright rejected it, though 
critical of the Libyan government, did not necessarily support the NATO intervention or the manner 
in which it was undertaken. This might be seen as less critical of R2P as a concept, but more of the 
way in which the UN has implemented it. Brazil, for example, claimed that it had had  
“serious doubts on whether the use of force, to the extent provided for by the Resolution *1973+, 
would lead to the realization of our common objectives… It is regrettable that the manner in which 
the resolution has been implemented has not dispelled our doubts. Furthermore, the use of force has 
made a political solution more difficult to achieve” in the region.”
377 
Since 2011, Brazil has issued numerous statements reaffirming its concern over the way in which 
R2P’s responsive pillar is implemented arguing that “Member States too must be clear on how they 
                                                          
370 “Libya has also seriously failed to uphold its responsibility to protect its civilian population” 
ICRtoP, 2011a 
371 “There is not any doubt that the most basic human rights of the population… are being 
systematically and blatantly violated.” ibid 
372  “Any government has the fundamental and unyielding responsibility to protect its own 
population. The current Libyan regime made a mockery of this responsibility by suppressing its own 
people.” ibid 
373 “the illegal nature of the war being carried out by NATO members – is the most recent example of 
the pathological need of certain States to subordinate the people of the World no matter the cost” 
and expressed its “firmest rejection of the use of the ‘misnamed responsibility to protect’ in order to 
intervene in our countries, to bomb civilians and change free and sovereign governments.” Lopez, 
2011 
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domination” (Venezuala, 2010) 
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are fulfilling the mandate they have received from the Council…. *And that the+ use of force by 
peacekeepers to protect civilians must be carried out with utmost restraint”378 and argued that R2P 
“must not be used as a pretext for regime change or meddling in domestic politics.” 379  
Aside from Brazil, Latin American’s response to the Libyan crisis was relatively mute, with the second 
most vocal group of actors being R2P rejectionists such as Cuba and Nicaragua who took the 
opportunity to criticise not only the actions undertaken by NATO, but the R2P concept as a whole.380  
Developing receptions and contribution to R2P debate 
While Latin America’s initial reception to R2P was relatively similar to other regions, in the years 
following the Summit, conversation regarding the norm petered off somewhat and states rarely 
discussed it unless they were strong advocates or were criticising its implementation. Few Latin 
American states have made reference to the norm during the numerous open debates held by the 
UN on R2P related topics, perhaps not seeing it as intrinsically linked to the maintenance of human 
rights in the region in the way some African states did. Despite the general impression of 
indifference, Latin America’s engagement with R2P is more comprehensive in comparison to other 
regions, and states appear seemingly oblivious to the efforts of distant advocates to shift the 
emphasis away from pillar 3 to increase the norm’s congruence. 
 Like in other regions of the world, the release of Ban Ki-Moon’s 2009 report on R2P saw discussion 
on the topic proliferate, even within Latin America, and in a rare display of interest 16 countries 
referenced the norm in the General Assembly.381 Most of these states were either strong supporters 
of the norm, such as Colombia and Guatemala or vehement critics like Cuba and Venezuela, and it 
appears as if there has been little change in reception in response to R2P’s reconceptualization.  
Colombia for example remained supportive of R2P and thanked Ban Ki-Moon for his contribution to 
the discussion on the norm, reaffirmed its commitment to all pillars, and elaborated on the necessity 
for a clearer framework of response to be established.382 Cuba on the other hand remained critical 
of the norm claiming that the Secretariat’s report “surpassed the intergovernmental agreement” 
and reaffirmed its position against the norm arguing that there “is no legal standard justifying the 
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381 These countries were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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legal character of a humanitarian intervention by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.”383 
Despite the 2009 reconceptualization of R2P into 3 pillars, those countries within Latin America that 
had been highly critical remained so and continued to attack the concept in its entirety rather than 
just the 3rd pillar. Venezuela for instance, thought that Ban Ki-Moon’s report incorrectly assumed 
that R2P had been agreed upon and noted 
“with concern the attempts of certain States to obstruct the debate on the concept of the 
responsibility to protect... those countries have baselessly tried to maintain that that concept is a 
standard that can be applied without engaging in the necessary discussion. Our country fully agrees 
with those States that have expressed the view that the Security Council is not in a position to 
interpret or utilize that concept before a consensus has been reached in the General Assembly.”384 
In 2010 Venezuela continued to argue that there was no consensus relating to R2P, that the norm 
undermines state sovereignty, and that R2P is simply a form of “neo-colonial domination.”385 This 
position has not changed since and Venezuela’s response to Libya was that “powerful countries are 
manipulating the concept of the responsibility to protect… they are seeking solely to impose their 
strategic interests on the world.”386  
Whereas in other developing regions, Ban Ki-Moon’s reconceptualisation of R2P was followed by a 
decline in pillar 3 references from both norm-entrepreneurs and states, this trend did not extend to 
Latin America. For instance while Guatemala is considered an advocate of R2P387 and congratulated 
the Secretariat in 2009 for its report claiming “I do not say it as a mere courtesy. The document is 
very well crafted, not only from the angle that matters most, the substance, but also in its structure 
and drafting”388, it also articulated its concerns with the norm (primarily the tension with non-
interference, misuse, and lack of agreement regarding terms).389 States within Latin America also do 
not seem as opposed to early warning detection systems as those within Asia, with a series of 
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statements made by Latin American countries contributing to debates on how to improve and 
implement such practices.390  
Of all the states within the region it is perhaps Brazil’s reception to R2P that has shown the most 
significant shifts. Brazil has increasingly become one of the most vocal commentators on R2P within 
the Latin American region and has distinguished itself from its peers by remaining firmly undecided 
as to its commitment to R2P. Because of this, Brazil’s behaviour from a distance appears relatively 
similar to states from other developing regions. In response to the 2009 report released by Ban Ki-
Moon, Brazil argued that the political boundaries of R2P were clearly set in 2005 and that any 
discussion on the norm should not change these.  It claimed that the R2P offered “a powerful 
political call for all States to abide by legal obligations already set forth in the Charter, in relevant 
human rights conventions and international human law and other instruments” and that Ban Ki-
Moon’s contribution should remind the community that they “already had the tools to act” which 
were written within the WSO Document.391  
Unlike other states that are wary of R2P, Brazil’s concerns about coercive responses saw it become 
one of the more constructive Latin American commentators on pillar 3, and in 2011 it called for the 
need for “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP). This concept reflects the country’s reservations 
about the efficacy of military intervention and seeks to establish a framework for response which 
calls for strict adherence to international conventions and ‘responsible’ peacekeeping.392  While this 
report has sparked a number of discussions by R2P proponents and rejectionists alike, it appears to 
be a ‘one off’ and Brazil’s broader engagement with R2P response continues to be cautious. 
Though Brazil agreed that conceiving of R2P as 3 pillars was useful, like so many developing states in 
other regions, it took advantage of the conceptual shift of R2P into different tenants to distance the 
norm’s uncomfortable aspects arguing that the 3rd pillar must be a last and final resort attaching  
“particular importance to the aspect of prevention… *Brazil claimed that the+ first step towards a 
durable solution to humanitarian crises is to identify their root causes, which usually include 
underdevelopment, poverty, social exclusion and discrimination. Therefore, in addressing the 
responsibility to protect, we should deal first and foremost with cooperation for development and try 
                                                          
390 Guatemala for example contributed to debates by arguing that the need to strengthen the 
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to devise ways to reduce the disparities of all sorts that exist within nations, and among nations and 
regions.”393 
In a similar fashion to states in Africa, Brazil’s de-emphasis of pillar 3 saw an emphasis on pillar 1 and 
2 as well as an attempt to conflate good governance measures with R2P prevention activities. 
Despite its release of RwP in 2011, Brazil’s engagement with R2P has taken on a predominantly more 
‘preventative’ emphasis in more recent years. In 2011 it stressed the need to promote social and 
economic development as a way to obtain peace and security as “political stability and social and 
economic development are closely interlinked and [are] mutually reinforcing”394 and in 2012 it 
argued that “it is always worth reminding ourselves that prevention is the best policy.”395 Brazil 
hasn’t explicitly rejected R2P’s 3rd pillar, indeed its engagement is exemplary when compared to 
sovereignty-wary nations in other developing regions. Despite this, the country still appears to be 
attempting to reconcile its commitment to non-interference with its continually increasing role in 
regional and world politics and its position on R2P is likely to continue to fluctuate in the years to 
come. 
Findings 
Latin America’s reception of R2P is relatively similar to that of other developing regions, in that 
states have had mixed views on the norm.  While the region contains some of R2P’s most vocal 
commentators, the majority of states have remained overwhelmingly silent in R2P discussions and 
efforts to diffuse the norm are generally pushed by international actors. 
One of the most interesting things to note after analysing the region is the relative stability of states’ 
receptions to R2P, as most states continue to take the same stance towards the norm that they did 
when it was first endorsed in 2005. This has seen countries such as Argentina and Colombia continue 
to support the norm, while others like Cuba and Venezuela continue to criticise it.  The refinement of 
R2P in Ban Ki-Moon’s 2009 report was equally praised and rejected by states within the region, 
whereas other developing regions began to engage more actively with particular pillars after 2009.  
Furthermore, Latin American states have not reacted in any unexpected fashion on account of R2P’s 
third pillar being implemented in other regions.  The way in which states condemned or condoned 
the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 generally coincided with their broader views on the norm.  
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Some commentators have noted that due to its colonial legacy and strong adherence to non-
intervention, the “main dimensions *to be+ considered regarding the implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect in Latin America and the Caribbean are the preventive dimension and, 
eventually the rebuilding dimension.”396 While R2P does contrast deeply with the regions cognitive 
priors, given their relatively restrained responses to the use of R2P in other areas of the world it is 
unlikely that emphasising the preventative pillars would increase support. The Latin American 
reception of R2P and the lack of local attempts to institutionalise or localise the norm does not 
appear to be due to the concerns of the sovereign-wary, rather it is perhaps more shaped by a sense 
that the norm does not appear to have a great deal of relevance to the region. While many of the 
regional bodies have made reference to ‘human rights’ in recent years and some have altered their 
charters or set up mechanisms to monitor these, few have related these new capacities to the R2P 
norm and have generally remained silent towards the norm reflecting their members disinterest.  
It is perhaps the norms almost ‘irrelevance’ to the region that has allowed many Latin American 
nations to discuss R2P’s more controversial aspects. Unlike other developing regions, Latin American 
states have treated R2P comprehensively and engaged in debates regarding all 3 pillars which has 
allowed for some surprisingly positive and innovative contributions, most notably  Brazil’s notion of 
‘Responsibility while Protecting’. However, this has not seen them actively diffuse the norm within 
the region, which suggests that local and non-local advocates will have to try other methods to 
promote the norm and increase its relevance within the region to gain the support of indifferent 
states. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis has provided a comparative assessment of the diffusion of the R2P norm in Africa, 
Southeast Asia and Latin America. The findings challenge claims that R2P has been ‘unanimously’ 
endorsed and suggest that there is an emerging trend by actors to discuss and thus conceive of only 
the preventative aspects of R2P, even by those states that had previously recognised the norm 
comprehensively. While this decline in willingness to discuss the reactive capacity of R2P may be 
short term, the nexus dividing endorsement for pillars 1, 2, and 3 within regions such as Africa 
appears to have expanded since 2005. This insight contributes to emerging literature which argues 
for a discursive approach to analysing norm diffusion, as it is clear that R2P is not simply being 
localised by individual states but is instead being fundamentally altered throughout the developing 
world and is losing its impetus in responding to mass-atrocities as was originally intended. 
Whether or not R2P is being accepted or accommodated within developing regions depends on 
what one conceives R2P to be. This thesis has sought to conceive of R2P as a process rather than a 
static entity and as such suggests that what R2P is today, has changed significantly from what R2P 
was in 2001. The conceptualisation of R2P that seems to increasingly be most warmly received 
within developing regions appears to be a norm designed to promote the prevention of mass 
atrocity crimes rather than the response to them. This conclusion creates the foundation for further 
research in the area and much more work will need to be undertaken in order to discern the extent 
of this trend. 
Africa’s reception to R2P should have been the most positive as its regional architecture reflected 
the 2005 norm closely. Instead, many states within the region were critical of R2P when it was 
endorsed in the World Summit and remain so to this day. The reception has not followed a straight 
line since 2005, and African states have shifted their stance towards the norm in response to how it 
has been emphasised by local and non-local actors, as well as how it has been used in practice. Most 
states’ concerns about the norm are a result of the norm effecting change to the conceptualisation 
of sovereignty and diminishing a state’s claim to non-interference, an apprehension that seems to 
have increased following implementation of the norm in instances such as Libya.  
Despite these concerns, R2P advocates and commentators have claimed that R2P is being diffused 
within the region, often pointing at the myriad of institutions that have been set up in its wake. True 
to these claims, African states in general appear to have become more accommodating or at least 
willing to discuss the norm in recent years. Even though many states disapproved of how NATO 
carried out the Libya intervention in 2011, no new states have rejected the norm on this account. 
This increasingly warm reception of R2P is most evident after 2009 when the norm was 
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reconceptualised into three pillars. While other factors may have contributed to this phenomenon, it 
seems relatively likely that the emphasis by norm advocates on 1st and 2nd pillar activities as well as 
the ability for states to discuss and publicly endorse aspects of the norm they agree with, whilst 
ignoring those they don’t, may have contributed to this slightly warmer reception.  
Discussion on R2P by African states has increasingly taken a single sided focus and references to its 
3rd pillar are rare and are generally either tacit or critical. The steady shift in R2P focus towards its 
preventative pillars is not merely vocal, but has affected the way states have been internalising the 
norm as well. While the African Union and its various subsidiaries do reflect tenets of R2P, these are 
primarily the preventative aspects of the norm. Those organisations that are congruent with R2P’s 
reactive capacities seem to lack the political will or ability to act in instances where atrocities are 
taking place, as demonstrated by Africa’s reluctant performance during the Libyan crisis in 2011. 
Thus, while Africa appears to be increasingly accommodating R2P, this is overwhelmingly with 
regard to the preventative aspects of the norm. In a fashion reminiscent of localisation, states within 
the region are not simply framing R2P but are actively (or tacitly as the case might be) ‘pruning it’ 
and removing the 3rd pillar from the norm which has potentially been made easier due to the way in 
which R2P’s tenets were distinguished from one another in 2009.  
Southeast Asia has always been seen as a region that would be resistant to the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ and true to this call, none of its regional groups and few states have undertaken active steps 
to institutionalise R2P. The norm’s initial reception by states was, as in Africa, split between 
acceptance, rejection, and a willingness to discuss the concept further. Unlike Africa however, 
stances towards R2P have not shifted in any significant manner since the initial cascade of 
endorsement or rejection. While states have occasionally referenced the norm (primarily in 
roundtables held by non-local norm-entrepreneurs or within the UN) such comments have been few 
and far between and generally highly critical of the 2nd and 3rd pillars, even with advocate states like 
Singapore referring to them cautiously.  
R2P’s third pillar has never been implemented in Southeast Asia, and the one instance in which it 
was attempted (Cyclone Nargis) led to an outcry from regional states and arguably raised concerns 
about the potential for its misuse. Claims that R2P is being accommodated within the region seem 
far-fetched then, given that no state has made any significant effort to institutionalise the norm. 
Furthermore, the R2P-related policy priorities which are being undertaken by states represent 
tenets of the ASEAN charter and as such were activities that states were already undertaking. The 
attempt by both local and non-local actors to conflate an increasingly broad range of activities with 
pillar 1 to show R2P endorsement, or to argue that the norm is being accepted, has significantly 
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expanded the 1st pillar and has done little to increase positive receptions of pillars 2 and 3 within the 
region. As such, Southeast Asia has overwhelmingly focused on the preventative aspects of R2P and 
has remained silent or critical towards its responsive capacities. In general, the region has remained 
relatively silent and perhaps indifferent regarding R2P, and there has been no real local effort to 
diffuse or discuss the norm. External actors remain the primary promoters of the concept. 
Latin America on the other hand is the only region that has continued to treat R2P comprehensively. 
The region’s initial reception R2P was comparable to that of Africa and Southeast Asia, however 
commentators on the norm expressed much stronger opinions regarding their rejection or 
acceptance of it. Like in Southeast Asia the reception by Latin American states’ to R2P has not shifted 
dramatically since 2005. R2P has never been invoked within the region and its implementation in 
other regions has not seen these states shift from their earlier stated views (positive or negative). 
While the majority of the region has seemed to be relatively indifferent to R2P, perhaps due to many 
conceiving of it as a concept for Africa whence it came, those that do discuss the norm have tended 
to engage all of its tenets rather than just the preventative aspects like in other regions of the world.  
Although regional organisations have been identified as entities that can provide a variety of 
opportunities for norm advancement and implementation, only those organisations in Africa seem 
to have made significant efforts towards this goal. However, the myriad of institutions within Africa 
which contain R2P-like principles in their mandates have suffered from a lack of political will and 
capacity to respond to atrocities and are increasingly focused on conflict prevention. The OAS and 
ASEAN have thus far seemed unwilling to embrace R2P in any substantive manner let alone advocate 
it to their members.  
How regions and the states that inhabit them receive R2P is ultimately a question of how congruent 
the norm is with pre-existing principles and ideas. The obvious point of contention for R2P is that it 
contrasts heavily with the notion of sovereignty and non-interference which has been a fundamental 
characteristic of the international system for the past four hundred years. Essentially, whether an 
actor accepts or rejects R2P is decided by the significance that it attributes to these more traditional 
norms which are weighted against the relatively new R2P norm. Perceptions of norms can change, 
and this thesis has attempted to analyse these changes over time and practice in order to discern 
how R2P has been received by developing regions. Its findings affirm the conception that norms are 
not static and that their content can change between actors and over time. Thus this thesis has not 
sought to analyse whether or not developing regions have accepted R2P, but rather how they have 
received R2P. How they have accepted or rejected it, how they have perceived it, and how they have 
engaged in discussion about it. It finds that developing regions and the states that inhabit them are 
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increasingly unwilling to discuss the 3rd pillar of R2P. This decline in discussion on the reactive tenets 
of R2P has affected the internalization of the norm within developing regions which have either 
failed to establish responsive capacities, or have been increasingly unwilling to use them. Thus, R2P 
seems to be steadily shifting from its original impetus as a norm to respond to mass-atrocities 
towards a norm that is overwhelming designed to prevent them. This raises significant questions as 
to the need for such a norm, given that many of these preventative tenets can be found in regional 
charters and existing cosmopolitan norms which were being implemented without the R2P label. 
Furthermore, if R2P is a norm about the prevention of atrocities, what happens when prevention 
fails?  
 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
                                                          
i The constructivist approach taken is in an attempt to recognise that in collecting and codifying the 
data, conclusions drawn will be subject to this authors own beliefs (Creswell 2009). Although there is 
no easily obtainable method to overcome this bias within such a short research project, opinions 
expressed in existing studies which assess how R2P has been diffused within Africa, Latin America, 
and South Asia are used within the empirical analysis. Constructivism has been chosen as the 
theoretical framework in which to analyse material and draw conclusions as it offers the widest 
‘interpretive’ lens, allowing context and societal influences to factor into the discussion(Finnemore 
1996, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Dunne, Kurki et al. 2007). As this is a study comparing different 
states’ interpretations of R2P within the same time period, being able to assess context and societal 
impacts upon norm interpretation is vital for a variety of reasons. First, while things such as systemic 
factors could have easily impacted upon the interpretation of R2P, these same factors would have 
affected all regions which would not account for any discrepancy in interpretation or 
implementation. Second, other theories of International Relations, such as realism do not place 
much emphasis on norms and therefore offer very little in the way in which to analyse the norms 
interpretation and impact (Dunne, Kurki et al. 2007). Third, theories on how and why norms are 
diffused (such as norm localization) are often written within the same constructivist framework, 
which make up the theoretical framework (Dunne, Kurki et al. 2007). Constructivism as a theory of IR 
is best suited to this study then, because of its ability to account for societal and contextual factors, 
as well as its strong tradition in explaining the phenomena of social norms. 
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